Brehony, R (on the application of) v Greater Manchester Police

Under section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986, a chief officer giving written directions about an intended assembly must identify the statutory basis for the directions and give outline reasons for the relevant belief. Detailed reasons are unnecessary, but the explanation must enable recipients to understand the decision and a court to assess whether the belief was reasonable. The statutory test concerns whether serious disruption or disorder may result; it does not require proof that it will, or that it is more likely than not. The court reviews the assessment deferentially, but the human-rights context increases the justification required for substantial interference. Temporary relocation of demonstrations may be proportionate where it pursues a legitimate aim and no less intrusive effective measure is available.

The claimant sought judicial review of written conditions imposed by the Chief Constable under section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986. The conditions relocated demonstrations by the Victory to the Intifada group and a counter-demonstration away from a Marks & Spencer store during the busy Christmas shopping period, limited them to three hours, and capped attendance at 20.

The claimant alleged inadequate reasons, irrationality, and disproportionate interference with rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The issues were whether the statutory belief was reasonably formed, whether adequate reasons had been given, and whether the conditions were proportionate.

1. Application dismissed. The written direction was lawful, and the claimant was ordered to pay the defendant’s costs, subject to the usual public-funding assessment arrangements.
2. A direction concerning an assembly intended to be held under section 14(2)(b) of the Public Order Act 1986 must identify the applicable limb of section 14(1). Where section 14(1)(a) is relied on, it must identify whether the anticipated consequence is serious public disorder, serious damage to property, serious disruption to the life of the community, or a combination of them.
3. The chief officer must give outline reasons for the belief. They need not be detailed. They must explain why the directions are being given sufficiently to enable the recipients to understand the decision and the court to assess whether the belief was reasonable. The letter satisfied that requirement by referring to the two demonstrations, their proximity, and the exceptional Christmas shopping crowds.
4. Section 14(1)(a) is a no-fault provision. It is unnecessary to show that demonstrators intended to cause disorder or disruption, or possessed criminal intent. The statutory word “may” requires a reasonable belief that the assembly might produce the specified consequences; it does not require a belief that they will occur or are more likely than not. The Chief Constable could consider both demonstrations and their close proximity.
5. The assessment was not irrational or unreasonable in the Regina v Ministry of Defence, Ex parte Smith sense. The court could intervene only if the decision fell outside the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker, while the human-rights context remained important to the intensity of review.
6. Assuming proportionality review applied, the conditions pursued the legitimate aim of preventing serious disruption and disorder in a crowded pedestrian area. They were temporary, applied on limited dates, imposed on both demonstrations, and left an alternative well-frequented location available. Applying the analysis in The Queen (on the application of Samaroo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the interference was proportionate.

This was a first-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. Permission was granted by Hughes J on 17 December 2004, but interim relief was refused. The challenged conditions expired on 4 January 2005.