Jones & Ors v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

For the purposes of section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986, a public assembly must be a particular gathering at a particular scene. Separate gatherings, separated by time and distance, do not become one assembly merely because they are coordinated by the same organisation. The power to impose conditions on an assembly being held cannot be used by a police officer to impose a prospective area-wide prohibition on future gatherings. Such a power would circumvent the statutory safeguards and the distinction drawn between conditions on a particular assembly and statutory powers to prohibit specified classes of assemblies. A condition imposed on a coordinated series of present and future gatherings was therefore unlawful where the officer had no power under section 14(1) to impose it.

The claimants challenged a condition imposed by a superintendent under section 14(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 on the Extinction Rebellion Autumn Uprising. The condition required any assembly linked to the protest to cease within London by a specified time. The protests involved coordinated gatherings at different locations over several days and were expected to cause serious disruption.

The issues included standing, permission to apply for judicial review, whether the coordinated protests constituted one public assembly for section 14 purposes, whether the condition was uncertain, and the appropriate relief. The condition was revoked before the hearing, but the parties agreed that the statutory interpretation issue should be determined.

1. Standing and permission. The third, fourth and seventh claimants had sufficient interest because they had been arrested for, or directly affected by, the condition. The first, second, fifth and sixth claimants were supporters of the movement but had produced no evidence that they intended to protest after the condition or had been deterred by it. They therefore lacked sufficient interest. Permission was granted to the claimants with standing and refused to the others.
2. Meaning of public assembly. Section 14(1), read with section 16 of the Public Order Act 1986, requires a public assembly to be located at a particular place to which the public has access, wholly or partly open to the air, and capable of being described as a scene. The reference to the senior officer being present at “the scene” is inconsistent with an assembly extending across multiple locations. The reasoning in R (Jukes) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] EWHC 195 (Admin) supported that conclusion.
3. Separate gatherings separated by time and many miles remain separate assemblies even if coordinated under one organisational umbrella. The superintendent’s condition covered both existing gatherings and intended future gatherings. It therefore amounted in substance to a prospective area-wide prohibition, although section 14(1) authorises conditions on a particular assembly and does not confer a power to prohibit future public assemblies.
4. The contrast with sections 13 and 14A, which expressly address all processions or trespassory assemblies and contain additional safeguards, reinforced that interpretation. The condition was unlawful because the superintendent had no power under section 14(1) to impose it.
5. The court did not decide whether the condition was sufficiently certain. The appropriate relief was a quashing order quashing the decision to impose it.

This was a first-instance judicial review claim heard as an expedited rolled-up hearing. The condition was imposed on 14 October 2019, revoked on 18 October 2019, and would in any event have expired on 19 October 2019. The court nevertheless determined the statutory interpretation issue and quashed the decision.