Luton Landlords & Letting Agents Limited, R (on the application of) v Luton Borough Council

In judicial review, a company must establish a sufficient interest through a direct effect, a genuine representative role, or an appropriate public-interest basis. General assertions of membership are insufficient without evidence that the company acts for affected members. At the permission stage, the court may exclude hopeless claims and may prefer a directly affected claimant who is better placed to sue. A public authority may rationally proceed on available data after weighing the value and delay of obtaining more information. A report challenge requires a distinct, material defect that materially misleads decision-makers. Unlawful fee recovery is separate from the validity of a licensing designation and does not, without more, invalidate it.

Luton Borough Council designated the whole borough for additional HMO licensing under Part 2 of the Housing Act 2004 and South Ward for selective licensing under Part 3. Luton Landlords & Letting Agents Limited sought judicial review of the designations.

Heather Williams J refused permission, holding that the company lacked sufficient interest and that the grounds were unarguable: [2024] EWHC 2979 (Admin). The appeal concerned standing, reliance on 2019 housing data, alleged misleading financial information, and the inclusion of enforcement costs in an early-bird licence fee.

The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Lewis LJ gave the judgment, with Elisabeth Laing LJ and Holgate LJ agreeing.

1. Standing. Under section 31(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, sufficient interest depends on the claimant’s connection with the challenged matter. A company may have standing as a representative body or pressure group, but incorporation for the purpose of litigation is not itself sufficient. The claimant had no direct interest in the designations and had not produced reliable evidence that it acted for members affected by the licensing schemes. The earlier company with the same name and the claimant were separate legal entities.
2. The suggested alter-ego basis was not the pleaded basis of the claim. In any event, the directly affected landlord was the obvious claimant, and the court would need to consider whether the company was better placed to sue. The later witness statement was refused under rule 52.8 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998; the court was hearing an appeal against refusal of permission, not reconsidering permission afresh.
3. A judicial review claimant must provide a candid, accurate and sufficiently detailed account of material facts known, or discoverable after proper inquiry. That duty continues although the claim form is served. The deficient evidence could have affected permission, costs and the assessment of evidential sufficiency.
4. The authority acted rationally in relying on the 2019 BRE data. It had considered whether to obtain updated information and was entitled to weigh the likely assistance against a three-month delay. The executive was not materially misled by the reports. On a fair reading, they accurately explained full-cost recovery, the prohibition on profit, the early-bird fee and the initial revenue cost.
5. Any unlawfulness in requiring an upfront enforcement-cost payment would concern fee recovery, not the designations themselves. Assuming Gaskin was correctly decided, it did not make the designations unlawful. Even if the arrangements formed one system, the defective charging element could be severed, leaving the designations intact.

The judge below was therefore correct to refuse permission.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal and upheld the refusal of permission.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Heather Williams J dismissed the renewed application for permission on standing and arguability grounds: [2024] EWHC 2979 (Admin).
• High Court, on the papers: Sir Peter Lane refused permission, and the refusal was reconsidered at an oral hearing.