McCourt, R (On the Application Of) v The Parole Board for England And Wales & Ors

A victim of crime, or a close relative where the victim has died, may have a sufficient interest to challenge directly by judicial review a Parole Board decision to release an offender. Standing depends on the context and on what is required to protect the rule of law; it is not confined to challenges concerning the victim’s own participation or licence conditions.

The Parole Board must apply the same public-protection test in every case. A prisoner’s continued denial of guilt may be highly significant or determinative if it prevents proper risk assessment, but it does not create an automatic presumption against release. The Board may rely on objective risk assessments, expert evidence and a risk-management plan. Permission remains subject to an arguable public-law error and is likely to be refused where an available reconsideration procedure has not been used.

Mrs Mary McCourt, whose daughter was murdered by Ian Simms, sought judicial review of a Parole Board decision directing Simms’s release. Simms continued to deny the offence and had never disclosed the location of Helen McCourt’s remains. The decision was confirmed on independent reconsideration.

The claim was heard as a rolled-up permission hearing. The grounds alleged lack of standing, misdirection as to the relevance of the denial and non-disclosure, failure to make reasonable inquiries, irrationality and procedural unfairness. The central issues were whether a close relative had standing to challenge the release decision and whether the Parole Board had made an arguable public-law error.

1. Standing. The Court held that a victim or, where the victim is deceased, a close relative may have a sufficient interest under section 31(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 to challenge a Parole Board release decision directly. The interest arises from the direct impact of the decision and from the requirements of the rule of law. It is not necessary to show that the Secretary of State has first decided to bring proceedings. Standing is not limited to matters concerning the victim’s participation or licence conditions.
2. Distinction from sentencing. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Bulger was distinguishable. A Parole Board decision concerns current risk and is not part of the sentencing process. The Board applies different tests and may consider a broader evidential basis.
3. Denial of guilt and non-disclosure. The Court rejected the submission that particularly heinous offences attract a special presumption against release. The same legal test applies in every case: whether detention remains necessary for public protection. A denial must be treated as a relevant factor and may be determinative where it prevents proper assessment of risk, but it is not necessarily conclusive. The Board must assess it alongside all other relevant evidence.
4. Procedural choices and rationality. The Board has a broad discretion over the process by which it reaches its decision. Its choices are not for the Administrative Court to second-guess except in an extreme case. The panel was entitled to rely on extensive expert evidence, the prisoner’s history in open conditions and the risk-management plan. It was not irrational to conclude that risk could be managed in the community, and the panel was not required to refer to every item of evidence.
5. Unenacted legislation. The proposed Prisoners (Disclosure of Information about Victims) Bill was not law. The panel was right not to delay the decision in anticipation of legislative change; in any event, the proposed provision would have required consideration of non-disclosure and its reasons, matters already considered.
6. Procedural fairness. The refusal to disclose the full dossier or provide an index, the undertaking required for attendance, and the summary of reasons did not disclose an arguable breach of the applicable Rules, Victims’ Code or guidance.
7. Disposition. The Court refused permission to apply for judicial review because no arguable public-law error had been established. The judgment was granted permission to be cited. Costs were ordered against the claimant in favour of the second interested party, subject to the stated cap; otherwise there was no order for costs.

This was a first-instance rolled-up judicial review hearing. An earlier interim-relief application was refused by a Divisional Court in [2020] EWHC 433 (Admin). The present Court refused permission to apply for judicial review.