Kanja Sandy, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In reviewing a refusal of naturalisation based on the good-character requirement, the court must apply traditional judicial-review principles. The Secretary of State’s evaluation is primarily a moral assessment entrusted by Parliament and is reviewable only for bad faith, failure to consider mandatory relevant matters, consideration of irrelevant matters, or demonstrable irrationality in the Wednesbury sense.

A court must not conduct a merits-based or proportionality review outside a Convention-rights context. Published guidance identifies matters which the Secretary of State must consider, but the decision-maker is not required to investigate or advance defences which the applicant has not raised. Relevant past association with organisations or persons responsible for atrocities may support a finding of bad character, even without proof of direct involvement in particular crimes.

The claimant, a Sierra Leone national, had been granted asylum and later indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. He subsequently applied for naturalisation. The Secretary of State refused the application on good-character grounds, relying on his senior role and associations within organisations responsible for war crimes during Sierra Leone’s civil war, despite his subsequent exemplary life in the United Kingdom.

Following an earlier judicial-review claim and reconsideration, the claimant challenged the renewed refusal. Permission was granted on a ground alleging failure to consider possible defences, his distancing from past associations, and the degree of his personal involvement. The central issues were the applicable intensity of review and whether those matters had been considered.

1. The claim was dismissed. The decision-maker’s finding that the claimant was not of good character was an evaluation under section 6(1) and Schedule 1 paragraph 1(1)(b) of the British Nationality Act 1981. If the Secretary of State is not satisfied that the applicant is of good character, the application must be refused; the residual discretion to grant naturalisation arises only where she is satisfied that the requirement is met. This accords with R (Amin) v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 439.

2. Good character is an abstract fact requiring a value judgment with a strong moral content. It is an evaluation, not an exercise of discretion in the technical sense. The applicant bears the formal burden, and the civil balance of probabilities applies. The Secretary of State may adopt a high but reasonable standard of character. The assessment is entitled to substantial judicial deference: R (on the application of Al-Enein) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2024, R (DA (Iran)) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 654 and R v SSHD ex parte Fayed (No 2) [2000] EWCA Civ 523.

3. The applicable judicial-review standard was traditional Wednesbury irrationality. The Secretary of State must act in good faith, consider matters which she is bound to consider, and exclude irrelevant matters. If those requirements are met, the merits of the evaluation are not reviewable, even if a court might have reached a different conclusion. The court relied on Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.

4. A free-standing or crypto-merits-based proportionality review was unavailable in this non-human-rights naturalisation case. Keyu [2015] UKSC 69 did not establish that proportionality had replaced traditional rationality review in all domestic judicial review claims. The structured proportionality approach in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39 remained applicable in recognised Convention-rights or discrimination contexts, not here.

5. Ground A failed because the claimant had not raised duress, superior orders, or related mitigation in his applications. The Secretary of State was under no duty to go beyond the four corners of the application, obtain evidence, or formulate arguments on the claimant’s behalf.

6. Ground C failed because the guidance did not require proof of direct personal participation in particular war crimes. Association with persons or organisations involved in terrorism, extremism or war crimes could be relevant, with duration and circumstances of association being relevant evidential considerations.

7. Ground B failed because the decision letter expressly considered the claimant’s subsequent family life, employment, absence of convictions and otherwise irreproachable conduct, including his complete severance from his former associations. The decision-maker was entitled to conclude that those factors did not outweigh the seriousness of his past conduct and associations.

The judgment records that an earlier judicial-review claim was withdrawn by consent, with reconsideration directed by an order dated 10 January 2022. The renewed challenge to the reconsidered refusal was permitted on one ground and refused on another. The present High Court judicial-review claim was dismissed.