Ali Tawfik Mohamed Amin (R on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Naturalisation requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied that the applicant is of good character. The applicant bears that burden. The assessment is an evaluative judgment assigned by Parliament to the Secretary of State and is reviewable only for irrationality or another public-law error.

There is no fixed period after which past associations with extremists must be disregarded. The significance of elapsed time depends on all the circumstances, including whether the associations ended freely and whether there is evidence that the applicant no longer shares or approves the relevant views.

The appellant, an Iraqi national with indefinite leave to remain, applied for naturalisation after an earlier application had been refused for motoring offences. The Secretary of State refused the later application because she was not satisfied that he was of good character. She relied on his freely chosen associations with Mullah Krekar, whom he knew to lead Ansar al Islam, and with other persons holding extremist views.

Following reconsideration and a supplemental letter, the appellant sought judicial review. A Deputy High Court Judge dismissed the claim. The appeal alleged that the Secretary of State had ignored material matters, acted irrationally, misapplied good-character guidance, and that the judge had given inadequate reasons.

Appeal dismissed. The court upheld the refusal of naturalisation and the dismissal of the judicial-review claim.

1. Under section 6(1) of the British Nationality Act 1981, read with Schedule 1 paragraph 1(b), the Secretary of State could not grant naturalisation unless satisfied that the applicant was of good character. The applicant had to establish that condition. The assessment was one for the Secretary of State, subject to public-law review for irrationality or another relevant error.
2. There was no fixed period after which historic extremist associations had to be ignored. The significance of time was fact-sensitive. It was open to the Secretary of State to find that the associations had ended because of the breakdown of the marriage and control-order restrictions, rather than the appellant's free choice, and that there was no evidence of a change in the views she inferred he shared.
3. The Secretary of State was entitled to rely on the appellant's admitted knowledge of Mullah Krekar's role, his initiation and continuation of contact, and his close associations with other persons holding extremist views. She could rationally infer knowledge of, and association with, those views, and regard discrepancies in the appellant's later account as an attempt to distance himself from them.
4. The appellant's release without charge, compensation for an unlawful control order, later marriage and children, and the passage of time did not compel the conclusion that he was of good character. The three decision letters, read together, addressed the relevant information and the applicable guidance. They disclosed neither irrationality nor a failure to consider relevant factors.
5. The High Court judgment adequately identified the law, facts, submissions and reasons for rejecting the claim. No ground of appeal was established.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) The appellant's appeal from the dismissal of his judicial-review claim was dismissed: [2022] EWCA Civ 439.
• High Court Mr Richard Clayton QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, dismissed the claim for judicial review of the refusal of naturalisation. No citation for that judgment was stated.