Friarwood Ltd v Champagne Cattier SA

Under the Sale of Goods Act 1979, satisfactory quality is assessed by the standards of a reasonable person, having regard to the goods’ description and all relevant circumstances. In a dispute about wine deterioration, the judge must assess the extent of objective changes in colour, taste, pressure and oxidation. Expert witnesses may explain the product and relevant trade practices, but the statutory question remains for the judge. The period during which a reasonable merchant would expect the goods to remain saleable provides the yardstick for assessing premature deterioration. An appellate court should avoid substituting its own factual findings where it has not heard the experts. A retrial may be required where the trial judge has rejected material expert evidence on an erroneous legal basis.

Friarwood Ltd v Champagne Cattier SA concerned a claim for damages under section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Friarwood alleged that champagne supplied by Cattier had deteriorated prematurely and was not of satisfactory quality when delivered.

The Central London County Court preferred Friarwood’s tasting evidence and concluded that the champagne had aged prematurely. Cattier appealed, arguing that the judge had misunderstood the evidence of its expert and had failed to consider the period for which a reasonable wine merchant would expect the champagne to remain saleable.

The central issues were the proper assessment of satisfactory quality, the role of expert evidence, and whether the Court of Appeal should determine the factual dispute itself or order a retrial.

Moore-Bick LJ gave the leading judgment. Richards LJ and Tuckey LJ agreed. The appeal was allowed and a retrial directed.

1. Statutory assessment. The quality of the champagne had to be assessed under sections 14(2) and 14(2A) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 by reference to the standards of a reasonable wine merchant buying non-vintage champagne from a reputable, though not top-flight, producer for wholesale and retail resale. The assessment had to take account of the description of the goods and all relevant circumstances.
2. Objective deterioration. The question whether the champagne had aged more quickly and extensively than could reasonably have been expected depended on the extent of changes in colour and taste, loss of pressure and oxidation. It did not depend simply on the types of consumer to whom mature champagne might still appeal.
3. Expert evidence. The experts could describe the wine, explain its qualities in light of its age, give evidence about its development, and address trade practices and consumer preferences within their expertise. Whether the champagne was of contractual quality when delivered remained a question for the judge, who had to apply the statutory test to all the evidence. The judge had therefore erred in rejecting Stevenson’s evidence on the ground that he had applied the standards of a sophisticated consumer.
4. Retrial. The judge had failed to grapple with the fundamental conflict between the tasting experts. The Court of Appeal was not in a fair position to substitute its own findings without having heard them, particularly given the nature of the evidence. A retrial was unavoidable.
5. Shelf-life and costs. The period for which a reasonable wine merchant would expect the champagne to remain acceptable to the market at large was the yardstick for measuring its development. The appropriate period had not been determined below and was left for the retrial. The first-instance costs order was set aside, and the trial costs were reserved to the judge hearing the retrial.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal allowed. The first-instance decision was set aside, a retrial was directed, and the trial costs were reserved to the judge hearing the retrial: [2006] EWCA Civ 1105.
2. Central London County Court: His Honour Judge Lindsay Q.C. preferred Friarwood’s expert tasting evidence and concluded that the champagne had aged prematurely and was not of satisfactory quality at delivery.