M v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In an asylum claim based on conversion to Christianity, country guidance distinguishing ordinary converts from more active converts is applied by assessing intended religious practice and any additional risk factors. An ordinary convert who is not a leader, pastor, proselytiser or evangelist will not ordinarily face a sufficient real risk for protection, although additional circumstances may elevate the risk. A tribunal’s inconsistency about the scope of reconsideration does not invalidate its decision where, read as a whole, it clearly decides the disputed issue and reaches a conclusion supported by the evidence. The Court of Appeal may also consider a late appeal where the consequences of refusal justify doing so despite an unsatisfactory explanation.

An Iranian national claimed asylum after converting to Christianity in the United Kingdom, asserting that return would breach Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. An adjudicator accepted that the conversion was genuine but dismissed the appeal, finding no sufficient risk unless Christianity was practised publicly or conversion was encouraged. On reconsideration, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal considered the expert evidence, the country guidance in FS and Others (Iran – Christian Converts) [2004] UKIAT 00303, and possible additional risk factors. It treated the appellant as an ordinary convert and dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal considered the late filing of the appeal and whether the Tribunal had materially erred by limiting reconsideration while also addressing proselytisation.

Lord Justice Latham gave the judgment of the court. Lord Justice Laws and Lady Justice Hallett agreed. The appeal was dismissed, and the application was refused.

1. The notice of appeal was filed more than two months late, contrary to the 14-day period in paragraph 21.7(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 practice direction. Although the explanation was not entirely satisfactory, the court exercised its discretion to consider the merits because of the consequences of the underlying decision for the appellant.
2. The Tribunal’s preliminary ruling directed that reconsideration should focus on the expert evidence, additional risk factors and the father’s position. The Tribunal nevertheless heard and recorded the appellant’s evidence about how she would practise Christianity and whether she would proselytise. Its later conclusion that she was an ordinary convert was inconsistent with the preliminary ruling only in the limited sense that it addressed an issue which the ruling had said was outside the reconsideration. Read as a whole, the determination contained a clear decision on that issue. The inconsistency therefore did not invalidate the result.
3. The Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the appellant was an ordinary convert. Her evidence showed cautious practice, discussion of Christianity with open-minded people and family members, and one conversation with an Indian friend. That evidence did not compel a finding that she was a more active convert. The Tribunal was also entitled to consider her earlier evidence before the adjudicator, which was consistent with her later account.
4. The Tribunal properly considered whether any additional risk factors, apart from conversion itself, elevated the appellant into a higher-risk category. Its conclusion that there were none was open to it. Applying the guidance in FS, the appellant therefore did not qualify for protection under the Geneva Convention or the European Convention on Human Rights.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — [2006] EWCA Civ 1192: admitted the late appeal for consideration on the merits and dismissed it.
2. Asylum and Immigration Tribunal — AIT No. HX/62550/2003: on reconsideration, decision promulgated on 23 September 2005, dismissed the appeal.
3. Adjudicator — 3 February 2004: dismissed the appellant’s original appeal against refusal of her protection claims.