D (A Child)

In adoption and freeing proceedings, an order authorising termination of parental contact is fact-sensitive. The court must assess the child’s welfare, the parent’s history and ambivalence, the likelihood of disruption, and the proximity of adoption. A parent’s late change of position does not require further assessment where professional evidence shows no realistic prospect of meaningful rehabilitation and further work would delay the child’s outcome. An unusual case involving continuing wider-family relationships does not govern materially different facts. A carefully reasoned first-instance welfare and discretionary assessment should stand where it falls within the permissible range.

The mother applied for permission to appeal against orders made by Pauffley J on 13 March 2006 concerning her son D. A care order and care plan for adoption had already been made after the mother, through counsel, stopped seeking assessment for rehabilitation. In the freeing proceedings, the judge permitted a further assessment, but concluded that there was no realistic prospect of rehabilitation, that adoption would promote D’s welfare, and that the mother was unreasonably withholding agreement. She also authorised the local authority to terminate contact under section 34(4) of the Children Act. The central issues were whether further assessment or continued contact should be ordered, and whether the judge had properly exercised her discretion.

1. Permission refused. Wall LJ gave the judgment, with which Thorpe LJ agreed. The proposed appeal had no realistic prospect of success.
2. The judge was entitled, and on Wall LJ’s assessment of the professional evidence was bound, to conclude that there was no realistic prospect of rehabilitation between the mother and D. The mother had been given a final opportunity to demonstrate meaningful change. Dr Ratnam’s evidence showed that her apparent acceptance of past errors was intellectual and did not reflect genuine insight or changed beliefs. Further assessment would not assist and would delay D’s outcome.
3. Freeing proceedings involved two requirements. Adoption had to safeguard or promote D’s welfare throughout childhood, and the mother had to be unreasonably withholding agreement. The first requirement was plainly met in light of the care order and care plan for adoption. The judge had directed herself correctly and had given seven appropriate reasons for finding unreasonable withholding of agreement. Her evaluative decision was within the proper limits of discretion.
4. The order under section 34(4) of the Children Act was also upheld. The issue was fact-sensitive. The mother’s history and ambivalence, the likely disruption to D from continuing contact, and the likelihood of imminent adoption entitled the judge to permit contact to be terminated.
5. Re G was distinguishable. It concerned highly unusual facts involving two sets of twins and continuing wider-family relationships, and the first-instance judge had refused to make freeing orders. Those circumstances did not govern this case.
6. The court criticised the local authority’s failure to keep the mother informed about D, stating that this was unacceptable as a matter of good practice, even though she need not be allowed to participate in the arrangements. The judge was also entitled to take D’s paternity into account, although it was not of great significance.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) ([2006] EWCA Civ 1204): an earlier paper refusal of permission was renewed orally. The application was refused.
2. Principal Registry of the Family Division: Pauffley J made orders on 13 March 2006 in freeing proceedings, following earlier care proceedings. The orders included adoption-related findings and authority for the local authority to terminate contact.