Devjee v Patel

In committal proceedings for breach of a protective injunction, procedural fairness depends principally on whether the alleged contemnor had clear notice of the allegations and a proper opportunity to answer them. A missing summons or procedural irregularity does not automatically invalidate committal where the person knew the case to be met and suffered no injustice. An adjournment for legal representation remains a matter of judicial discretion, balancing representation, delay, custody and the interests of the protected person. Relevant historical evidence may be considered when assessing credibility. Sentencing is fact-sensitive; imprisonment is not precluded for a first committal, and consecutive terms may be justified for serious breaches.

Following a hearing in Northampton County Court on 4 July 2006, His Honour Judge Waine found that Nilesh Devjee had twice breached a non-molestation order made in favour of Manju Patel under Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996. The breaches were an assault outside employment offices on 2 June and smashing a window at Ms Patel’s home shortly after midnight on 18 June. The judge imposed two consecutive immediate terms of three months’ imprisonment.

Mr Devjee appealed, contending that the process for the first allegation was defective, that he had been denied an adjournment for legal representation and a fair trial, that prejudicial evidence had been admitted, and that the sentence was excessive. The central issues were whether the procedural irregularities caused serious injustice and whether the committal and sentence should stand.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld both the committal findings and the six-month aggregate sentence. It directed that time spent on remand before 4 July 2006 be taken into account in calculating the sentence served. The appellant received an assessment of his publicly funded costs.
2. In committal proceedings, procedure is important because a person facing contempt must know the allegations and have an opportunity to address them. The absence of a formal summons, or failure to follow the precise procedure, does not itself invalidate the proceedings where the allegations were sufficiently notified and the irregularity caused no serious injustice. The appellant knew by 19 June that the 2 June incident would be pursued, received the respondent’s statement, and had sufficient time to prepare.
3. The judge was entitled to refuse a further adjournment for representation. Representation was desirable, but the case was simple, the appellant had already been remanded on several occasions, the likely duration of further delay was uncertain, and the respondent’s interests also required consideration. The judge assisted the unrepresented appellant by ensuring that statements were read out, allowing cross-examination, eliciting his evidence and inviting final submissions.
4. The procedure was fair. The appellant had the allegations in writing, heard the evidence, cross-examined witnesses, gave evidence and addressed the judge. The judge was entitled to consider relevant background evidence, including undisputed telephone calls, CCTV evidence and previous visits, when assessing credibility. D v Cambridgeshire County Council [1999] 2 Fam LR 42 did not preclude that approach. The judge was plainly satisfied to the criminal standard that the allegations were made out.
5. The sentence was not manifestly excessive. The seriousness of the breaches, particularly attending a former partner’s home at night and breaking a window in breach of an order, justified immediate imprisonment. The guidance in Hale v Tanner [2000] 1 WLR 2377 did not require a suspended sentence or non-custodial disposal. Sentencing remained fact-sensitive, and the consecutive three-month terms were within the proper range.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2006] EWCA Civ 1211 dismissed the appeal from the committal findings and sentence imposed by His Honour Judge Waine.
• Northampton County Court: On 4 July 2006, the court found two breaches of the non-molestation order and imposed two consecutive immediate terms of three months’ imprisonment.