Weston v Gribben & Anor

After limitation has expired, a new claimant may be added only within the limits of the Civil Procedure Rules. The court must focus on the claim as originally formulated and ask whether the claimant’s identity can be changed without significantly altering that claim. The same loss and factual background will not suffice where substitution changes the pleaded basis of the duty and the identity of the person suffering the loss. A conscious choice to sue the wrong person, or a later tactical or legal misjudgment, is not the relevant mistake. Where the alleged duty concerns property owned by a company, the proper claimant is the legal owner; a beneficiary cannot maintain a duplicative personal claim.

Mr Weston sued Mr Gribben and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for losses allegedly caused by the fraudulent transfer of property interests in Spain. The Dominion Beach property was legally owned by Grass Inversiones SL, of which Mr Weston was administrator. Mr Weston claimed personally, asserting that he had a beneficial interest.

Lightman J struck out Mr Weston’s claim concerning Dominion Beach, refused further amendment, but allowed Grass to be joined so that Mr Weston could pursue a claim based on his alleged beneficial interest. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office appealed that joinder, and Mr Weston appealed the restriction on Grass’s proposed claim for the whole loss. The central issues concerned the meaning and application of CPR rule 19.5(3)(a) and (b) after expiry of the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal granted Mr Weston permission to appeal and granted the Foreign and Commonwealth Office an extension of time. It dismissed Mr Weston’s appeal and allowed the cross-appeal. The Dominion Beach claim therefore fell out of the proceedings; only Mr Weston’s claim concerning the berth remained.

1. The court upheld the conclusion that any duty arising from the alleged loss of the Dominion Beach property could be owed only to Grass as legal owner. A separate duty to Mr Weston as beneficial owner would duplicate the legal owner’s remedies. His beneficial-interest claim was therefore bad in law.
2. Under CPR rule 19.5(3)(b), joinder was not necessary where the original claim could not properly proceed because the claim asserted by the existing claimant was legally untenable.
3. For CPR rule 19.5(3)(a), the court applied section 35(6)(a) of the Limitation Act 1980 and the overriding objective. The relevant question was whether the identity of the claimant could be changed without significantly altering the formulation of the claim.
4. The proposed Grass claim required material changes. The duty of care would have to be pleaded as owed to Grass as legal owner, and the misfeasance claim would have to identify Grass as the foreseeable victim. The loss would also have to be pleaded as Grass’s loss. The amendment therefore concerned a materially different claim, despite relying on the same facts, causes of action and quantum.
5. There was no relevant mistake. The parties knew Grass’s identity and legal status, and Mr Weston could have caused Grass to sue when proceedings were issued. His conscious decision to bring a personal claim, even if ultimately mistaken or tactically unwise, did not fall within rule 19.5(3)(a).

Lady Justice Hallett and Lord Justice Sedley agreed with Lord Justice Lloyd.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On [2006] EWCA Civ 1425 , Mr Weston’s appeal was dismissed and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s cross-appeal was allowed.
• High Court (Chancery Division): Lightman J’s order of 1 September 2006 struck out Mr Weston’s Dominion Beach claim, refused re-amendment, and permitted Grass to be joined only for a claim based on Mr Weston’s alleged beneficial interest.
• High Court: Peter Smith J had earlier dismissed an application to strike out the proceedings, after which Mr Weston amended his particulars of claim.