Lee-Lawrence v Penwith District Council

For intentional homelessness under the Housing Act 1996, occupation is a question of fact, intention and degree. A mere legal right to possession does not establish occupation, but it is relevant. Possession of keys, use of the premises and representations that it was the applicant’s home may provide circumstantial evidence from which occupation can be inferred. Sleeping or furnishing the premises is relevant but not essential. On an appeal on a point of law, the court must respect the local authority’s primary role in deciding factual questions. Intervention is justified only where the decision is legally flawed, procedurally irregular, unreasonable or perverse.

Mr Daniel Lee-Lawrence appealed against a review decision by Penwith District Council that he had become intentionally homeless. The Council considered that he had occupied 39 Blascomay Square under a tenancy, but had deliberately ceased to occupy it when the tenancy ended. The review decision therefore left him with only the limited duty applicable to an intentionally homeless applicant under the Housing Act 1996.

His first appeal to Truro County Court, before His Honour Judge Vincent, was dismissed on 1 November 2005. The second appeal concerned whether Mr Lee-Lawrence had ever occupied the property and whether the Council had made sufficient findings on that issue.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the Council’s review decision and HHJ Vincent’s dismissal of the first appeal.
2. Under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996, intentional homelessness requires a deliberate act or omission in consequence of which the applicant ceases to occupy accommodation that was available and reasonable to continue to occupy. Whether accommodation was occupied is a question of fact, intention and degree. A mere right to possession is insufficient by itself, but it is a relevant consideration. Physical sleeping or furnishing is not a necessary element.
3. The court’s function on an appeal on a point of law was limited. The local authority had the primary responsibility for deciding factual questions. Applying the approach stated by Lord Brightman in R v Hillingdon London Borough Council ex parte Puhlhofer [1986] 1 AC 484, the court should intervene only where the decision involved an error of law, procedural irregularity, bad faith, or perversity.
4. The Council was entitled to infer occupation from the tenancy, possession of the keys, the meeting with the housing officer, housing benefit applications and representations identifying the property as Mr Lee-Lawrence’s home. The conflicting accounts and credibility concerns were also relevant. The review letter sufficiently implied a finding that he had lived at the property at least occasionally.
5. That finding was enough to satisfy the statutory requirement of cessation of occupation when the tenancy terminated. The Council’s conclusion was not perverse or so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached it. The appeal was dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On the second appeal, the court dismissed the appeal: [2006] EWCA Civ 1672.
• Truro County Court — His Honour Judge Vincent dismissed Mr Lee-Lawrence’s first appeal on 1 November 2005.
• Penwith District Council — The Council’s review decision dated 13 April 2005 found Mr Lee-Lawrence intentionally homeless and therefore subject only to the limited statutory duty.