Richmond Court (Swansea) Ltd v Williams

Under section 24(1) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the court must identify the alleged treatment, its reason, whether that reason relates to the person’s disability, the appropriate comparators and whether the treatment was less favourable.

The disability-related reason for requesting an alteration is distinct from the manager’s reason for refusing it. A refusal based on reasons of general application does not constitute less favourable treatment where the manager would refuse every occupier in the same circumstances. Sections 22 to 24 impose no positive duty on managers of premises to make, or consent to, disability-related alterations to common parts.

An elderly disabled lessee could reach her third-floor flat only with great difficulty. She sought her landlord’s consent to install a stair-lift in the common staircase at her own expense. The landlord refused consent for reasons including aesthetics, repair costs and inconvenience to residents.

A district judge refused the landlord’s application for summary judgment. On appeal, the designated trial judge determined as a preliminary issue that the refusal constituted discrimination under section 22(3) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.

The landlord appealed. The central issue was whether its refusal amounted to less favourable treatment for a reason relating to the lessee’s disability within section 24(1), notwithstanding that it would refuse any occupier permission to install a stair-lift.

1. Appeal allowed. The refusal of consent did not constitute discrimination under sections 22(3) and 24(1) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Summary judgment was entered for the landlord.

2. Scott Baker LJ held that the court must first identify why the disabled person received the treatment in question. It must then compare the treatment given, or which would be given, to persons to whom that reason did not or would not apply. The relevant treatment was the refusal of consent. The pleaded reasons for that refusal included aesthetics, repair costs, inconvenience to residents and concern about noise. None related to the lessee’s disability. The disability explained her request for a stair-lift, but it did not explain the landlord’s refusal.

3. The landlord would refuse every occupier permission to install a stair-lift. The lessee therefore received the same treatment as the agreed comparators, namely able-bodied lessees in the same building. The refusal did not place her in a worse legal position than the others. Her physical disadvantage did not itself establish unequal or less favourable treatment.

4. Clark v Novacold Ltd [1999] ICR 951 and Manchester City Council v Romano [2005] 1 WLR 2775 supported an inquiry focused on the reason for the treatment and persons to whom that reason did not apply. They were distinguishable because the treatment in each case arose from a reason related to disability. The guide-dog example was also distinguishable because the café owner admitted non-dog owners while excluding the disabled person accompanied by a guide dog.

5. Sections 22 to 24 impose no positive duty on managers of premises to make reasonable adjustments or to consent to alterations of common parts. Parliament imposed express and defined adjustment duties in other fields, including employment and service provision. Construing section 24(1) as requiring consent would create a wider, undefined duty which Parliament had not enacted.

6. Richards LJ agreed. He formulated a five-stage approach under section 24(1) and concluded that the absence of a disability-related reason was sufficient to dispose of the claim. The reasons were of general application, and all tenants would have been treated alike. A positive duty required specific legislation rather than an altered construction of section 24(1). Auld LJ agreed with both judgments.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was granted and the appeal was allowed. The preliminary determination was reversed and summary judgment was entered for the defendants: [2006] EWCA Civ 1719.

2. Swansea County Court (Judge Wyn Williams QC): The appeal from the district judge was dismissed. Acting as the designated trial judge, he determined the preliminary issue in the claimant’s favour and held that refusal of consent constituted discrimination under section 22(3) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.

3. Swansea County Court (District Judge Evans): The defendants’ application for summary judgment was refused because the claim was considered to have a real prospect of success.