AM (Iran) v Secretary of State for Home Department

In asylum appeals, a fact-finding tribunal may attach substantial weight to a detailed account given promptly on arrival where a materially different account emerges later. The omission must be assessed in context, including the scope of the earlier questioning and the claimant’s answers. A concise determination is lawful where the relevant matters were canvassed and the conclusion was comprehensive and rational.

Fresh evidence may support an appeal based on an unfair mistake of fact amounting to an error of law. The evidence must concern an existing, established and material fact, the appellant must not be responsible for the mistake, and the evidence must be sufficiently connected to the tribunal’s reasoning.

The appellant, an Iranian national, claimed asylum after leaving Iran. An adjudicator rejected his account that Iranian security forces had searched his home because of banned books and films, relying principally on the contrast between his detailed entry account, concerning a warehouse incident, and his later asylum account. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed his appeal.

Before the Court of Appeal, the appellant challenged the treatment of the entry interview and sought to rely on fresh statements from another successful asylum seeker, BH, who said that the appellant had given him films. The central questions were whether the credibility findings disclosed an error of law and whether the Tribunal had unlawfully refused to admit the fresh evidence.

1. Credibility evidence. The adjudicator was entitled to admit and rely on the entry interview. There was no application to exclude it, no evidence that the interview formalities had not been complied with, and the appellant had given clear, detailed answers despite fatigue. The weight of the evidence was for the fact-finding tribunal within the limits of rationality (paras 15–19).
2. The adjudicator was entitled to attach considerable weight to the fact that the appellant gave a detailed account on arrival and a materially contrary account five weeks later. The later account was also introduced only after several questions in the full asylum interview. The omission was relevant in context, although it was not conclusive (paras 20–21).
3. The adverse credibility finding was comprehensive. Other matters had been canvassed in the evidence and submissions, including the timing of the alleged search, the alleged arrest of the appellant’s father and the absence of later contact with Iran. The adjudicator’s failure to repeat every factor in the conclusions did not disclose an error of law (paras 22–27).
4. Fresh evidence. The flexibility recognised in E and R does not ordinarily assist where the evidence was available to the appellant’s advisers before the adjudicator and no explanation is given for its omission. The proposed evidence also did not establish that incriminating material was present in the appellant’s home when it was allegedly searched. It was too remote from the adjudicator’s central finding that no raid had occurred (paras 31–36).
5. Lady Justice Arden added that circumstantial evidence may in principle give rise to an unfair mistake of fact, but the evidence here was too remote and did not satisfy the requirements in E and R. Permission to appeal on the substantive ground was refused and the appeal concerning fresh evidence was dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused permission on the challenge to the substantive credibility findings and dismissed the appeal against the AIT’s refusal to admit fresh evidence. [2006] EWCA Civ 1813.
• Asylum & Immigration Tribunal: dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the adjudicator’s decision and held that the concise determination disclosed no error of law.
• Adjudicator: dismissed the asylum appeal and found no well-founded fear of persecution or breach of the Refugee Convention or Human Rights Convention on return.