Reka v Secretary of State for the Home Department

On an appeal confined to error of law, the appellate court must determine whether the underlying adjudicator’s determination was legally flawed. It cannot intervene merely because the fact-finding appears strained or causes unease, provided the reasoning remains legally permissible. An adjudicator may rely on a country-information report where there is no reason to doubt its accuracy. Credibility findings should be assessed both individually and cumulatively. A doubtful subsidiary finding, including one concerning the absence of physical marks, does not invalidate the overall determination where the remaining findings are rational, supported by evidence and sufficient to sustain the result.

The appellant, an Iranian citizen, claimed asylum after alleging arrest, prolonged detention and torture following demonstrations in Tehran. The Secretary of State rejected his account as lacking credibility. An adjudicator dismissed his appeal, and the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal dismissed a further appeal on 10 October 2005, finding no error of law.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, challenging the adjudicator’s treatment of country information, the absence of visible injuries, alleged embellishment, the circumstances of his escape and documentary evidence concerning land deeds. The central issue was whether the adjudicator’s factual findings and inferences were legally irrational, perverse or unsupported by evidence.

Lady Justice Smith delivered the leading judgment. Lord Justice Sedley agreed in the result, and Lord Justice Auld agreed.

1. Scope of the appeal. Although the appeal was formally against the AIT’s decision and was limited to error of law, the practical question was whether the adjudicator’s determination was legally flawed. Criticisms of the AIT’s analysis or expression of its reasons could not succeed if the adjudicator’s overall conclusion was lawful.
2. Appellate restraint. The appellant had to show that one or more findings or inferences were perverse, irrational or unfounded in evidence. The appellate court could not intervene merely because it felt uneasy about the fact-finder’s reasoning or considered it strained, where the reasoning remained legally permissible. Sedley LJ emphasised that the possibility of serious error in asylum fact-finding did not enlarge the court’s limited error-of-law jurisdiction.
3. Country information. The adjudicator was entitled to rely on the CIPU report. There was no sufficient reason to regard its summary as inaccurate, and he was not required to speculate about the possible motives of a source or investigate every underlying document. He was entitled to infer that the relatively few students arrested were likely to have been leaders of particular interest to the authorities, and that a non-leader was unlikely to have been detained for the period claimed.
4. Cumulative assessment. Credibility findings should be examined separately for rational and evidential support, but the strands must then be considered collectively because they may reinforce or weaken one another. The concern about the reasoning based on the absence of residual physical marks did not undermine the determination. The remaining findings, including those concerning embellishment, the escape, the deeds and the account being tailored to known events, were rationally and evidentially supported.
5. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — In [2006] EWCA Civ 552, the court dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator’s determination was not legally flawed.
2. Asylum and Immigration Tribunal — On 10 October 2005, the AIT dismissed the appeal and held that the adjudicator had made no error of law.
3. Adjudicator — The determination promulgated on 6 January 2005 dismissed the appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of asylum and permission to remain.
4. Secretary of State — By decision dated 4 October 2004, the application for asylum was refused.