Klamer v Klamer

Permission for a second appeal requires an important point of law or practice, or another compelling reason, under section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999. A disparity in financial outcomes does not, by itself, satisfy that threshold. The court must consider the overall circumstances, respect clear findings made by the judge who heard the evidence, and avoid disproportionate further litigation. Authorities concerning short marriages cannot justify a second appeal where their essential factual or legal features are absent. A common marriage duration alone is insufficient.

The wife sought permission to bring a second appeal concerning ancillary financial relief following a short and unsuccessful marriage. District Judge Redgrave divided the parties’ assets and made a costs order after assessing their conduct, financial contributions and evidence. Bennett J dismissed the wife’s appeal on 26 May 2005. Before the Court of Appeal, the wife relied on the disparity in the outcome and referred to Parra v Parra and Miller v Miller. The issue was whether those matters disclosed an important point of law or practice, or another compelling reason, sufficient to satisfy the statutory threshold for a further appeal.

1. The application for permission to bring a second appeal was refused. Section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 imposes a formidable threshold: permission requires an important point of law or practice, or some other compelling reason.
2. The Court of Appeal was exercising a highly restricted second-appellate jurisdiction. The trial judge had heard and seen the parties give evidence and had made clear findings about their personalities, characteristics and reliability. The first appeal had also been fully considered by Bennett J. Those circumstances required restraint in reopening the discretionary financial decision.
3. The unequal financial outcome was not, in itself, an issue of principle or practice and was not, by itself, a compelling reason. Different outcomes may remain fair when assessed against the parties’ overall circumstances.
4. Parra v Parra was distinguishable because its essential feature was that the parties had effectively initiated a community of property regime. Miller v Miller shared only the duration of the marriage; its other features were materially different. Neither authority disclosed a point warranting full argument in the present case.
5. The decision under section 55 had to be proportionate. Granting permission would have produced another elaborate and expensive round of litigation between parties approaching retirement after an unhappy marriage. The application therefore failed, and the formal order was: application refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) On 2 May 2006, Lord Justice Thorpe refused the application for permission to bring a second appeal: [2006] EWCA Civ 690.
• Family Division Bennett J dismissed the wife’s appeal on 26 May 2005.
• District Judge Redgrave On 21 December 2004, the district judge determined the ancillary financial relief dispute, divided the assets and made a costs order against the wife.