Wood v Collins

An applicant may appeal without permission against a committal order under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, as may the contemnor. A suspended prison sentence is a committal order for this purpose. When increasing a sentence for civil contempt, the Court of Appeal applies principles similar to those governing an Attorney General’s reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Repeated harassment and prior breaches may make a short sentence unduly lenient, even where the latest breach involved words rather than violence. In family proceedings, the court must also consider securing future compliance. A suspended sentence may therefore remain appropriate where it serves that protective purpose.

The parties had been in a relationship and had a young daughter. Following its breakdown, cross-injunctions were made, including non-molestation and occupation restrictions. District Judge Mole found six breaches and imposed six months’ imprisonment. On appeal, HHJ Yelton dismissed the challenge to the findings but reduced the sentence to 28 days and suspended it on conditions.

After a further breach, HHJ Yelton imposed another 28-day suspended sentence. Anita Wood appealed, arguing that the sentence was unduly lenient. The central issues were whether permission to appeal was required and whether the sentence should have been longer or immediately effective.

1. Permission to appeal. The Court of Appeal had power to entertain an applicant’s appeal alleging that a contempt sentence was unduly lenient, following the principle identified in Lomas v Parle [2003] EWCA Civ 1804, [2004] 1 FLR 812. A suspended prison sentence is a committal order for the purposes of CPR 52.3(1)(a)(i), as established in Alan Wilkinson v Lord Chancellor’s Department (Official Solicitor intervening) [2003] EWCA Civ 95.
2. CPR 52.3(1)(a)(i) did not confine the permission-free appeal to the contemnor. Its plain words applied to an appeal against a committal order whether brought by the applicant or the contemnor. The earlier decision in Government of Sierra Leone v Davenport [2002] EWCA Civ 230 established that section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 did not limit the effect of section 54 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, but the provisional view expressed in that case that only the contemnor might appeal without permission was not followed.
3. In increasing a sentence for civil contempt, the Court of Appeal acts on principles similar to those applied by the criminal division on an Attorney General’s reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The latest breach must be assessed in context. The repeated harassment, threats, prior breaches and express warning that a further breach would attract immediate committal made 28 days unduly lenient. The absence of violence did not sufficiently reduce the gravity of conduct consisting of threatening or abusive words; Murray v Robson was applied.
4. The sentence was increased to three months. Mr Justice Hedley emphasised that family proceedings involve a tension between penalising breaches and securing future compliance. The judge was entitled to retain the suspension because the condition was directed to preventing further misconduct, and the Court of Appeal also took account of double jeopardy. The appeal was therefore allowed to that extent, with the suspension and its conditions retained.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — In [2006] EWCA Civ 743, the appeal was allowed to the extent that the sentence was increased from 28 days to three months. The suspension and conditions remained in force.
2. Colchester County Court — HHJ Yelton reduced District Judge Mole’s six-month sentence to 28 days and suspended it on conditions. Following a further breach, he imposed a further 28-day suspended sentence, which was challenged as unduly lenient.