Mayor & Burgesses of the v London Borough of Redbridge

On an application for permission to appeal, adjournment, trial duration, the weight given to medical evidence and factual assessments of alternative accommodation are principally matters for the trial judge. Appellate intervention is not justified merely because the appellant disagrees with those conclusions.

A statutory successor to a secure tenancy who succeeds as a child rather than a spouse remains susceptible to possession under Ground 16 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985, where alternative accommodation is provided. A purported tenancy term reflecting statutory succession does not prevent that consequence where the successor was not a party to the tenancy. Late reliance on an unproduced term, unsupported despite ample time to find evidence, does not justify reopening litigation.

The Council sought possession of a dwelling occupied by Ms Low, who had succeeded to a secure tenancy following succession through her mother. Ms Low argued that a term in the earlier tenancy agreement gave her the rights of a spouse and took her outside Ground 16 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985.

HHJ Simpson proceeded with the case in the Bow County Court and rejected the appellant’s contentions concerning adjournment, the duration of the hearing, medical evidence and her unwillingness to accept alternative accommodation. On an adjourned application for permission to appeal, Ms Low sought to rely on a tenancy document which had not been produced below. The central issue was whether that possible contractual term justified reopening the matter.

1. Application refused. Lord Justice Neuberger concluded that none of the grounds had a realistic prospect of reversing the trial judge’s decision or obtaining a retrial.
2. Whether to adjourn was principally for the trial judge. Both parties had been represented, and the judge was entitled to proceed. The shorter duration of the hearing than estimated was irrelevant. The judge was entitled to reject the general practitioner’s assessment, having seen Ms Low himself, and to take account of her refusal to accept any alternative accommodation. The latter was not a major issue in any event.
3. Ms Low had succeeded to the tenancy under the statutory provisions and was a secure tenant. As a child rather than a spouse, however, she remained susceptible to a claim for possession under Ground 16 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985. Ground 16 contemplated the provision of alternative accommodation and did not authorise eviction without anywhere else to go.
4. Any term in the earlier tenancy agreement would, if it existed, have been supplemented or replaced by the statutory provision. Ms Low’s succession rights were statutory, not contractual, because she had not been a party to the tenancy agreement.
5. The new point had not been taken below, although that did not automatically bar it. It was nevertheless relevant that Ms Low had been represented and had had substantial time, including more than a month after the previous hearing, to locate the document. There was no compelling evidence that the Council was concealing it. The need for finality in litigation therefore outweighed the speculative possibility that the document might assist her.

Order: Application refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On the adjourned application for permission to appeal, the application was refused. [2006] EWCA Civ 757.
• Bow County Court: HHJ Simpson proceeded with and decided the possession case. The judgment under challenge concerned the appellant’s succession to the tenancy and the application of Ground 16 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985.