Hughes v The First Secretary of State & Anor

In Green Belt planning, personal circumstances, including the need for settled accommodation and the effect on children’s education, are material considerations capable of amounting to very special circumstances. Their weight is a planning judgment for the Secretary of State. Statutory duties to secure the availability of suitable schools do not guarantee continuity of education or ensure that children will use those schools after moving. The Secretary of State may lawfully attach different weight to an inspector’s accepted findings without triggering the inquiry procedure for disagreement on facts or new factual evidence.

Four gypsy families occupied land in South Bedfordshire and sought retrospective permission for a caravan site. The local planning authority refused permission. On appeal under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the inspector recommended temporary permission, relying on the shortage of sites, the absence of alternatives and likely disruption to the children’s education and healthcare.

The Secretary of State accepted the inspector’s factual findings but dismissed the appeal, giving less weight to the educational consequences. Collins J quashed that decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The central issue was whether the Secretary of State had misunderstood the statutory education duties or had differed from the inspector on a material fact without complying with the inquiry rules.

1. Appeal allowed. The Secretary of State’s decision was restored.
2. The existence of the local education authority’s statutory duties was a matter of law, or deemed common knowledge. It was not a matter of fact or new evidence within Paragraph 17(5) of the Town and Country Planning Inquiry Procedure (England) Rules 2000. The Secretary of State therefore did not have to notify the parties or reopen the inquiry.
3. The Secretary of State had accepted the inspector’s conclusions that leaving the site would probably lead to travelling and roadside camping, discontinuity of education and disruption more serious for gypsy children. His statement that appropriate education would be available meant that suitable school places would remain available under the statutory scheme. It did not mean that the children’s education would remain continuous or undisrupted.
4. The duties under sections 13, 13A and 14 of the Education Act 1996 require the authority to secure the availability of efficient, properly equipped and sufficient schools, and to exercise its education functions with a view to promoting high standards. They do not require the authority to ensure that particular parents and children take advantage of those schools, or to guarantee uninterrupted education following a move.
5. The planning balance rested with the Secretary of State. Personal circumstances could amount to very special circumstances, as recognised in South Bucks District Council v Porter [2003] 2 A.C. 558, but the Secretary of State was entitled to attach less weight to them than the inspector. He had considered the material matters in the inspector’s report, made no material finding of fact contrary to the inspector and did not rely on fresh factual evidence. The court could not interfere merely because it might have struck the balance differently.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2006] EWCA Civ 838, the appeal was allowed and the Secretary of State’s refusal of planning permission was restored.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court): Collins J made an order on 14 November 2005 under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, quashing the Secretary of State’s decision and remitting the matter for reconsideration.