Wells v Mutchmeats Ltd & Anor

An appellate court will interfere with a trial judge’s apportionment of responsibility for contributory negligence only in rare circumstances. Intervention requires an error of principle, a misapprehension of the facts, or a conclusion that is clearly wrong.

A worker who knows that workplace equipment presents a hazard may be contributorily negligent by deliberately using it without taking an available precaution. The appellate court must assess whether the trial judge’s allocation falls outside the permissible range. It cannot substitute the allocation it would itself have preferred merely because it considers the defendants substantially more blameworthy.

A meat inspector suffered serious injuries when he stepped into a nearly empty disinfectant tray placed across a doorway at an abattoir. The tray slipped and caused him to fall.

Following a liability-only trial, the Oxford County Court found both defendants negligent and in breach of statutory duty. It attributed 40% of the responsibility to the claimant for contributory negligence and divided the defendants’ responsibility equally.

The claimant appealed against the finding of contributory negligence and, alternatively, against the 40% apportionment. The issues were whether his conduct amounted to a failure to take reasonable care for his own safety and whether the Recorder’s apportionment was clearly wrong.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Recorder was entitled to find the claimant contributorily negligent. The claimant knew that the tray was unstable when empty or nearly empty, had previously reported that hazard, and was responsible during his inspection for checking its disinfectant level. Nevertheless, he stepped into it without moving it or taking another available precaution. His negligence contributed to the accident.

2. Apportionment of responsibility is primarily a matter for the trial judge. Following the principle encapsulated in Plumb v (1) Lisa Ayres and (2) Ryford Ltd [1998] 1028/2, an appellate court will interfere only where the judge erred in principle, misapprehended the facts, or was clearly wrong.

3. The case was not an ordinary tripping or slipping case. The claimant knew of the particular hazard and had a duty to inspect the tray’s contents. Those circumstances materially increased his comparative blameworthiness.

4. Gage LJ considered that he might, as trial judge, have apportioned responsibility one-third to the claimant and two-thirds to the defendants. That different preference did not establish that the Recorder’s 40% assessment was wrong. Moses LJ likewise considered the defendants substantially more blameworthy, but concluded that the Recorder’s allocation remained within the range of reasonable responses.

5. The findings that the defendants were negligent and had breached Regulations 5.1 and 12.3 of the Workplace (Health Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1998 were not appealed. The order dismissing the appeal therefore left the Recorder’s 60:40 apportionment undisturbed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The claimant’s appeal was dismissed. The finding of contributory negligence and the attribution of 40% responsibility to him were upheld.

2. Oxford County Court: Recorder Hungerford found both defendants negligent and in breach of statutory duty. He attributed 60% of the responsibility to the defendants, divided equally between them, and 40% to the claimant for contributory negligence.