Woodham v JM Turner (t/a Turners of Great Barton) & Anor

In apportioning liability for contributory negligence, the court must assess both the causative potency of each party’s conduct and their relative blameworthiness. The Court of Appeal is ordinarily slow to interfere with an apportionment, but may do so where the trial judge’s allocation is clearly wrong or cannot be reconciled with the primary findings. Where those findings show that both parties were comparably responsible, and no identifiable reason justifies a different allocation, equal responsibility is appropriate.

A motorcyclist collided with a school coach emerging from a side road through a gap in stationary traffic. The High Court found both the coach driver and the motorcyclist negligent, attributing 70 per cent liability to the driver and 30 per cent to the motorcyclist. Permission to appeal was limited to the apportionment of responsibility; the finding that both drivers were negligent was not challenged. The central issue was whether the primary findings justified placing the greater share of responsibility on the coach driver.

Appeal allowed in part. The apportionment was varied so that the coach driver and the motorcyclist were each 50 per cent liable.

1. The Court of Appeal recognised that it is ordinarily slow to interfere with a trial judge’s apportionment of responsibility. The approach stated in Wells v Mutchmeats Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 963 applies: intervention is justified where the judge erred in principle, misapprehended the facts, or was clearly wrong.
2. Lord Justice Davis held that the accident would not have occurred if either party had acted differently. The coach driver proceeded slowly through a gap while her view to the right was blocked by a large tractor, but the motorcyclist, who knew the road and the junction, filtered past the stationary tractor on the off-side at a speed which prevented effective stopping or evasive action. His conduct was contrary to the guidance in the Highway Code and materially increased the risk of collision and serious injury.
3. In assessing relative responsibility, the court considered both causative potency and blameworthiness. The primary findings showed that the parties were comparably responsible. There was no sufficient reason to attribute a greater share to the coach driver.
4. Sir Stephen Sedley agreed with Davis LJ. Lord Justice Carnwath identified a logical gap in the trial judge’s reasoning: having described the motorcyclist as substantially responsible, the judge gave no identifiable reason for placing the coach driver’s responsibility higher. Equal responsibility was therefore the natural conclusion.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Appeal allowed in part. The 70:30 apportionment was varied to 50:50: [2012] EWCA Civ 375.
• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division) — Kenneth Parker J found both parties negligent and apportioned 70 per cent liability to the coach driver and 30 per cent to the motorcyclist. The citation of the judgment appealed was not stated in the judgment.