Gibson, R. v Rev 1

Accomplice evidence may be admitted although the witness has an incentive to assist the prosecution, provided that its potential unreliability is fairly exposed and the jury receives adequate warnings. A judge should not withdraw a case merely because that evidence has been strongly challenged if it remains capable of belief and, taken at its highest, proves the necessary participation in the offence.

In a joint trial, a co-defendant’s discredited witness does not require discharge of the jury where the risk of prejudice can be removed by clear directions. Fresh evidence advancing a new defence after conviction should not be received unless it is necessary or expedient in the interests of justice. Its credibility and the explanation for not adducing it at trial are central considerations.

The applicant was convicted at Winchester Crown Court of the murder of his daughter-in-law and sentenced to life imprisonment with a recommended minimum term. The prosecution case against him depended largely on the evidence of Annamari Weeks, an accomplice who had not been charged and later became a prosecution witness.

His proposed appeal challenged the admission of her evidence, the refusal of a submission of no case to answer, and the refusal to discharge the jury after two witnesses called by his co-defendant retracted false evidence. He also sought to adduce a late, unsigned statement advancing a substantially different account of the death and disposal of the body.

The central issues were whether those rulings rendered the conviction unsafe and whether the proposed fresh evidence should be received.

1. The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused. Time was extended by one day to validate the application, but none of the proposed grounds was arguable.

2. The trial judge was entitled to admit Weeks’s evidence. Accomplice evidence can be received although the witness may gain by giving false evidence. The essential safeguard is that the potential fallibility of the evidence is properly put before the jury. The judge had considered the witness’s changing position, the no-further-action letters, disclosure and the allegation of police coaching. He gave repeated and strong accomplice warnings. There was no basis for appellate interference with that exercise of discretion.

3. The refusal of the no-case submission was also correct. The judge confined himself to admissible evidence against the applicant and was entitled to conclude that a jury could find an agreement concerning the killing and disposal of the body, followed by aid or encouragement pursuant to it. Challenges to Weeks’s reliability were for the jury because her evidence remained capable of belief. The judge’s directions showed that he had not treated mere presence, silence, or participation in disposal alone as sufficient for murder.

4. The judge was justified in refusing to discharge the jury after the retraction of evidence called by the co-defendant. The defendants were properly jointly tried, the applicant had not called the witnesses, and the trial judge could neutralise any prejudice through careful directions. The jury was expressly directed neither to attribute the false evidence or payment to either defendant nor to use it for or against them. Subsequent admissions concerning the death further undermined any suggestion that the incident made the conviction unsafe.

5. Under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, the proposed new evidence was neither necessary nor expedient in the interests of justice. The applicant could have advanced that account at trial, gave no credible explanation for withholding it, and presented it only at the last moment after maintaining a false defence. The court found the new account incapable of belief and identified no exceptional feature creating a possible risk that the conviction was unsafe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The court extended time by one day but refused the renewed application for permission to appeal against conviction: [2006] EWCA Crim 1.

• Winchester Crown Court: The applicant was convicted of murder on 23 July 2004 and, on 30 July 2004, was sentenced to life imprisonment with a recommended minimum term of 10 years and nine months.