Maturine, R. v

In a joint-enterprise murder case involving weapons, liability must be directed to the weapon which caused death. A participant is guilty of murder only if the prosecution proves an intention that that weapon be used to kill or cause really serious injury, or foresight that it might be so used as a real possibility, coupled with continued participation. Knowledge of the weapon is necessary but not sufficient. Jury directions must be tailored to the live factual issues and read as a whole. Unnecessary stock examples and hypothetical questions about fundamental differences between weapons may distract a jury, but do not make a verdict unsafe where the directions overall make the material issues clear.

All three appellants were convicted of murder at the Central Criminal Court in May 2005. Two were also convicted of wounding with intent. The deceased suffered a fatal knife wound and a skull fracture caused by a baseball bat; the medical evidence was that each was more than a minimal cause of death.

The appellants contended that the trial judge's directions on joint enterprise confused the knife and the bat, and permitted conviction without proof that a defendant knew of or foresaw the weapon which caused death. One appellant also challenged the minimum term imposed on her life sentence. The central issue was whether the summing-up rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. The appeals against conviction were dismissed. Moses LJ, delivering the court's judgment, held that the directions had to be read as a whole. Although parts of the summing-up were unnecessarily long and imperfectly expressed, the earlier directions required the jury to decide which weapon or weapons caused death and to consider the weapons separately.
2. Where only one weapon causes death, joint-enterprise murder requires proof that the particular defendant intended that that weapon be used to kill or cause really serious harm, or, absent such intention, foresaw as a real possibility that it might be so used and nevertheless participated or continued to participate. Knowledge of the weapon is a necessary, but insufficient, ingredient. Foresight does not arise where joint intention to use the death-causing weapon with the requisite intent is proved.
3. The references to a “knife or bat” were, in context, references to whichever weapon the jury found had caused death. The amended count concerning grievous bodily harm and the directions to consider the weapons separately prevented the jury from treating foresight of one weapon as sufficient where another alone caused death. The directions therefore did not make the trial unfair or the verdicts unsafe.
4. The court nevertheless gave guidance. A judge should identify the real issue of causation first, then tailor concise directions to the live factual issues. Irrelevant examples of joint enterprise and fanciful issues about fundamental differences between armed and unarmed attacks should not be left to the jury. Where unrebutted expert evidence leaves no sustainable factual dispute, the judge may direct the jury robustly as to the real issues.
5. Grant's appeal against sentence was allowed. Her minimum term recommendation was reduced from 12 years to 10 years, reflecting her lesser role, age and good character. Time for Robinson to appeal was extended.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). In [2006] EWCA Crim 1545, the court dismissed the appeals against conviction, allowed Grant's appeal against sentence to the limited extent of reducing her minimum term recommendation to 10 years, and extended Robinson's time to appeal.
• Central Criminal Court. The appellants were convicted in May 2005 of murder; Robinson and Grant were also convicted of wounding with intent. Grant received life imprisonment with a 12-year minimum term recommendation.