George, R. v

An appellate court deciding whether a conviction is unsafe does not re-evaluate the prosecution case merely because the evidence contains matters capable of supporting innocence. Those matters are ordinarily for the jury, provided that the trial was fair and the directions were correct.

Where bad-character evidence is admitted because the defendant has attacked another person’s character, it is not admitted to prove propensity. The distinction between dishonesty and untruthfulness required where propensity is in issue does not govern that gateway. Evidence from an unreliable prison informant may remain for the jury where its dangers are fully disclosed and the jury receive strong directions.

The appellant was convicted at Stafford Crown Court on 6 May 2005 of the kidnapping and murder of Hilda Murrell. He received life imprisonment for murder, with a minimum term of 15 years, and a concurrent seven-year sentence for kidnapping.

DNA advances established that he had been in the victim’s house shortly before her death. He accepted burglary and sexual activity there, but alleged that his brother had attacked, abducted and killed her. On appeal, he challenged the safety of the verdict, principally by alleging misdirection on bad-character evidence and improper reliance on evidence from a prison informant. He also sought to renew other grounds, including delay.

1. Appeal dismissed. The verdicts were not unsafe. The court’s function was not to substitute its assessment of the evidence for that of the jury. Matters capable of supporting the defence, including the evidence about the appellant’s inability to drive and the absence of forensic evidence linking him to the vehicle or murder scene, were properly left to the jury.

2. The prison informant’s evidence was properly left to the jury. The prosecution had disclosed the informant’s criminal history, informant activity, unreliability and possible motives. The judge gave repeated and forceful warnings about the need for caution. There was evidence capable of supporting the account, including details which could have come from the appellant, but it remained for the jury to decide whether the informant had fabricated or assembled information from other sources. No application had been made under section 78, and there was no basis for exclusion.

3. The bad-character evidence was properly admitted under section 101(1)(g) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, because the appellant had accused his brother of the murder. Its relevant use was to enable the jury to assess the character of the source of that accusation; it was not propensity evidence. R v Hanson [2005] 2 Cr.App.R 21 required a distinction between dishonesty and untruthfulness where evidence is tendered to establish propensity under a different gateway, such as section 101(1)(d). It did not render the judge’s directions erroneous here.

4. The judge’s warnings were adequate. The use of a colourful prosecution phrase about the appellant’s previous convictions was better avoided, given the risk of prejudice inherent in the statutory scheme, but it did not undermine the safety of these convictions. Renewed leave on the remaining grounds was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): appeal against conviction dismissed in [2006] EWCA Crim 1652.
• Stafford Crown Court: on 6 May 2005, the appellant was convicted of murder and kidnapping and sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, subject to a 15-year minimum term, with a concurrent seven-year sentence for kidnapping.