Beatty v R

Where fresh psychiatric evidence establishes that, at the date of sentence, the statutory conditions for a hospital order were met, the Court of Appeal may admit that evidence in the interests of justice and replace a discretionary life sentence with a hospital order and restriction order. This differs from a prisoner who develops mental illness only after sentence, for whom transfer to hospital is ordinarily the appropriate course. Fresh psychiatric evidence requires careful scrutiny and each case turns on its facts.

The appellant pleaded guilty to rape, kidnapping and threats to kill. In 1991, the sentencing judge imposed a discretionary life sentence because the available psychiatric evidence did not establish that the appellant's psychopathic disorder was treatable, although the judge considered a hospital disposal preferable if legally available.

After later transfer to hospital and the grant of non-statutory ‘technical lifer’ status, the Criminal Cases Review Commission referred his sentence. Fresh psychiatric evidence was unanimous that he had been treatable at the time of sentence. The central issue was whether that evidence justified quashing the life sentence and substituting a hospital order with restrictions under the Mental Health Act 1983.

1. The appeal against sentence was allowed. The court admitted the fresh psychiatric evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. It was credible, admissible, reasonably unavailable at sentence, capable of affording a ground for allowing the appeal, and its admission was necessary or expedient in the interests of justice.
2. The fresh evidence established that the appellant's disorder was treatable in 1991. Had that evidence been before Popplewell J, the statutory conditions for a hospital order and restriction order under sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983 would have been met. The judge had expressly identified that disposal as the most appropriate one, but had been unable to make it because of the medical evidence then available.
3. The court followed the distinction drawn in Mitchell [1997] 1 Cr App R (S) 90, Hutchinson [1997] 2 Cr App R (S) 60, De Silva (1994) 15 Cr App R (S) 296, and Castro (1985) 7 Cr App R (S) 68. A hospital order is appropriate where its conditions existed at sentence, including where decisive information emerges later. Transfer under sections 47 and 49 is instead appropriate where mental illness or disorder supervenes after sentence. A transferred prisoner who recovers may return to prison, whereas a hospital-order patient is discharged under the mental-health regime.
4. Section 11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 permitted the court to quash the sentence and impose the order which the sentencing court could have made. The grant of ‘technical lifer’ status strongly confirmed that this was a case requiring correction, though the court stressed that fresh psychiatric evidence about the sentencing date must always be scrutinised carefully.
5. The life sentence was quashed and replaced by a hospital order with a restriction under sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On a Criminal Cases Review Commission reference, allowed the appeal against sentence and substituted a hospital order with a restriction for the life sentence: [2006] EWCA Crim 2349.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In 1993, dismissed the appellant’s renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence because the statutory preconditions for a hospital order were not then established.
• Crown Court at Birmingham: In 1991, Popplewell J imposed a discretionary life sentence after the appellant’s guilty pleas.