Bradfield, R v

On an application to vary a restraining order under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the court must balance the protected person’s continuing need for safety and reassurance against the restrained person’s legitimate practical needs, including employment and travel.

A refusal to vary may be justified where the applicant supplies no detailed evidence or workable terms for a variation that address the protected person’s continuing anxiety. There is no procedural unfairness from untested hearsay where the judge expressly disregards it.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to burglary, criminal damage and harassment arising from conduct towards his former partner. In July 2004, the Crown Court imposed a restraining order without limit of time. It prohibited communication with the complainant and entry into or approach within 500 yards of Porth Place, Porth.

After losing his employment and driving licence, the appellant sought a variation so that he could use local public transport and attend nearby benefits and employment offices. The Crown Court refused the application after considering the complainant’s continuing anxiety and the absence of detailed supporting proposals. The appellant appealed against that refusal.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court treated the appeal, with an extension of time, as an appeal against the original restraining order. It expressly left unresolved whether a refusal to vary such an order is itself a sentence capable of appeal. The judgment was not authority either for that jurisdictional proposition or for routinely extending time to challenge long-standing orders.

2. There was no breach of natural justice. The Crown Court judge had expressly disregarded the inadmissible hearsay in the complainant’s statement. It therefore did not require cross-examination or rebuttal by evidence from the appellant.

3. The judge had correctly undertaken the required balancing exercise. He considered both the appellant’s need to seek employment and use public transport, and the complainant’s continuing fear and sense of security provided by the order. The appellant’s altered circumstances were also substantially self-induced.

4. The appellant had put forward no evidence about the practical requirements of attendance at the Job Centre or benefits office, alternative arrangements, routes, or a precise draft variation. In the absence of proposals capable of addressing the complainant’s anxiety, the judge was entitled to give her protection priority and refuse to vary the order.

5. If a future variation application is made, it should be supported by evidence and detailed proposed terms.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the appeal against the refusal to vary the restraining order: [2006] EWCA Crim 2917.

2. Crown Court at Merthyr Tydfil: His Honour Judge Curran refused the appellant’s application to vary the restraining order on 14 August 2006.

3. Crown Court at Merthyr Tydfil: Her Honour Judge Eleri Rees imposed the restraining order on 9 July 2004 following guilty pleas.