Russell, R v

A criminal trial need not be aborted because a defendant deliberately disrupts it. Where responsibility for the disruption is manifest, and the jury can fairly continue after a clear direction to decide solely on the evidence, the court need not enquire into the jury’s reaction. Apparent unfairness is assessed by considering all relevant circumstances through the eyes of the fair-minded and informed observer.

Evidence admitted to prove presence at an incident may remain relevant after presence is admitted if it bears on conduct that remains in issue. Its significance is then for the jury.

The appellant was convicted at Leicester Crown Court of handling stolen goods, attempted murder, using a firearm with intent to resist arrest, and perverting the course of justice. The principal issue at trial was whether he was the man who fired at a police officer while fleeing from a stolen vehicle.

During the judge’s summing-up, the appellant escaped from the dock and attacked the judge. The judge refused to discharge the jury, directed it to disregard the incident, and the jury later returned guilty verdicts.

The appeal challenged the fairness of the summing-up, the treatment of evidence concerning another stolen vehicle, and the decision to continue the trial after the attack.

1. Appeal dismissed. The convictions were safe. The trial judge’s summing-up was careful, balanced and fair when read as a whole. It accurately presented the respective cases, gave lucid directions of law, and left disputed evidential inferences to the jury.
2. The judge was entitled to leave the evidence concerning the earlier stolen Audi with the jury. Although its primary relevance to the appellant’s presence at the later incident diminished after he admitted being present, it remained relevant to his disputed actions on that day. The significance and weight of that evidence were matters for the jury.
3. The court applied the fair-minded and informed observer approach stated in R v Medicaments No 2 [2001] 1 WLR 700. The brief presence of a prosecution witness in the judge’s room immediately after the attack, for security discussions, could not reasonably give rise to a real possibility of unfairness.
4. The court distinguished R v Brown (Robert Clifford) [2001] EWCA Crim 2828. In that case responsibility for events affecting the jury was unresolved. Here, the appellant’s responsibility for his own attack on the judge was manifest. He could not obtain the discharge of the jury and a retrial by deliberately disrupting the proceedings. Any complaint that the summing-up was unfair had to be pursued on appeal, not by interrupting the trial.
5. The jury had been properly directed to decide the case on the evidence heard before the incident and to disregard the attempted disruption. No enquiry of the jury was required. To permit a defendant to terminate a trial in this way would undermine the operation of trial by jury.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against conviction: [2006] EWCA Crim 470.
• Crown Court at Leicester: convicted the appellant on 16 November 2004 of handling stolen goods, attempted murder, using a firearm with intent to resist arrest, and perverting the course of justice.