Ian O, R. v

Section 120 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides a freestanding statutory route for admitting a complainant’s prior complaint as evidence of its truth. It does not import the former common-law requirement that complaint be made at the first reasonable opportunity.

Under section 120(7)(d), whether a complaint was made as soon as could reasonably be expected depends on its context, including the circumstances in which it was made and the person to whom it was made. The Act does not limit admissibility to a single complaint. A later complaint may properly be admitted where it has relevance beyond an earlier complaint and its admission is fair.

The appellant was convicted at Liverpool Crown Court of eleven sexual offences alleged to have been committed against his stepdaughter between 1987 and 1995. He received concurrent and consecutive sentences totalling 11 years’ imprisonment.

The prosecution relied, among other evidence, on complaints made by the complainant after she had left the family home. The trial judge admitted a complaint made to a friend and her mother, and a later complaint made to the complainant’s elder brother, under section 120 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

On his appeal against conviction, the appellant challenged the admission of the later complaint. The central issue was whether it satisfied the requirement in section 120(7)(d) that it be made as soon as could reasonably be expected after the alleged conduct.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge correctly admitted the complainant’s later complaint to her brother under section 120(4) and (7) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

2. The statutory provisions governing previous complaints are freestanding. It was therefore unnecessary to resolve whether the former common-law rules of recent complaint had been abolished. In any event, the appellant’s proposed approach wrongly imported the former requirement of complaint at the first reasonable opportunity. The statutory question is instead whether the complaint was made as soon as could reasonably be expected after the alleged conduct.

3. That question is contextual. It requires consideration of the circumstances in which the complaint was made and of the person to whom it was made. The complainant’s complaint to her brother was made during a family dispute, several months after her earlier disclosure and after she had left home. On those facts, the judge was entitled to find that it had been made as soon as could reasonably be expected.

4. Section 120 contains no restriction permitting only one hearsay complaint by an alleged victim. The later complaint had evidential relevance beyond the earlier disclosures because it was made to a different person, in materially different circumstances and against a different family background. Its admission was fair, subject to proper directions to the jury.

5. A statement admitted under the new statutory regime is evidence of the truth of its contents, rather than merely evidence of consistency. That feature supports a need to guard against unfairly cumulative self-serving complaints, but did not make this second complaint inadmissible.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against conviction in [2006] EWCA Crim 556.
• Crown Court at Liverpool: on 26 May 2005, convicted the appellant of eleven sexual offences and imposed total sentences of 11 years’ imprisonment.