Barrett v Universal-Island Records Ltd. & Ors

A settlement agreement must be construed objectively in its factual context. A general release may compromise unknown claims where clear language shows that intention, but its scope remains limited by the disputes and relationship being settled. A party who settled earlier litigation cannot ordinarily advance a new legal analysis of the same underlying facts. However, abuse of process does not generally bar a claim by an estate that was neither a party to the earlier proceedings nor represented by an administrator able to bring the claim. Copyright joint authorship requires a significant and original contribution to the creation of the work, not merely performance, arrangement or interpretation. Performers’ rights introduced by the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 amendments were new rights, but pre-existing agreements could provide a defence. The claim and counterclaim were dismissed.

Aston Barrett brought personal claims and claims as administrator of the estate of his deceased brother, Carlton Barrett, against record companies, members of Bob Marley’s family and companies owning relevant music rights. The claims concerned alleged contractual rights under recording agreements, partnership and unjust enrichment, copyright in disputed compositions, and performers’ rights in recordings and DVDs.

The defendants relied on a 1994 settlement of earlier Jamaican and New York proceedings, cause of action estoppel, abuse of process, estoppel, acquiescence and laches. The court first considered whether the claims were precluded, then addressed the estate’s surviving claims and the substantive issues.

1. Settlement and release. The 1994 settlement agreement was an accord and satisfaction. Read objectively and in context, its wide release covered claims arising from the Barretts’ relationship with Bob Marley and the record companies, including contractual, copyright and performers’ rights claims relating to past recordings and compositions. Aston Barrett’s personal claims were therefore compromised.
2. Enforcement. Although Island was not a party to the settlement, the Marley defendants could enforce it. The public interest in upholding settlements meant that a cause of action within a settlement supported by valuable consideration should ordinarily be barred unless the agreement itself could be set aside.
3. Carlton Barrett’s estate. Clause 7, requiring the Wailers to testify to the effect that they had no claim, was contrary to public policy insofar as it prescribed the contents of evidence. The agreement expressly contemplated a claim by Carlton Barrett’s estate and contained no implied term preventing Aston Barrett from acting as administrator. The estate was not barred by the settlement, abuse of process, estoppel, acquiescence or laches.
4. Abuse of process and estoppel. Aston Barrett could not reframe the partnership claim as agency, or advance copyright and performers’ rights claims which could and should have been raised in the earlier litigation. The estate’s position was different because it had not previously been a party and had not had an administrator able to bring proceedings.
5. Recording agreements. The Barrett brothers were not parties to the 1974 agreement. Although the documents initially contemplated their signature, the agreement operated as an agreement with Bob Marley alone. Bob Marley did not contract as their agent. The same conclusions applied to the 1975 agreement and, more strongly, to the Media Aides agreement.
6. Contractual and restitutionary claims. Island had paid the contractual royalties to the contracting party or its successors. Payment to one joint creditor would discharge the debt. The unjust-enrichment claim failed because Island had not been enriched at the Barretts’ expense. Any partnership claim lay against Bob Marley’s estate, not Island, and any partnership would have dissolved on Bob Marley’s death under section 33(1) of the Partnership Act 1890.
7. Copyright. Joint authorship required a significant and original contribution to the creation of the musical work. Musical performance, arrangement and interpretation were insufficient. On the facts, Bob Marley authored the disputed compositions, save that no copyright claim in the instrumental bridge to “Who the Cap Fit” could be established even if Aston Barrett had standing.
8. Implied licence. Participation in recordings made for release gave rise, at least in principle, to an implied non-exclusive licence to reproduce and distribute the recordings in substantially equivalent formats. The licence extended to CDs and DVDs where the relevant agreements contemplated audio-visual reproduction. The claimants could not establish absence of consent, and pre-existing arrangements also defeated the performers’ rights claims.
9. Performers’ rights. Rights under sections 182A and 182B of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 were new rights because of their different legal character and scope. Regulation 27 of the 1996 Regulations could therefore provide a defence where acts were done pursuant to agreements made before the relevant dates.
10. Result. The claim and the counterclaim for damages were dismissed. The court left open argument concerning the requested injunction.

This was a first-instance decision of the High Court (Chancery Division). The judgment records an earlier strike-out and summary-judgment decision in Barrett v Universal-Island Records Ltd, [2003] EWHC 625 (Ch), but the present court proceeded to trial and dismissed the claim.