Miklis v Deputy Prosecutror General of Lithuania

On an extradition appeal, fresh evidence unavailable at the magistrates’ hearing may be admitted without satisfying the strict requirements in Ladd v Marshall, where liberty and human rights are engaged. The appellant must nevertheless provide a good reason for its earlier absence.

For Article 3 purposes, the question is whether substantial grounds establish a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. General evidence of human-rights violations is insufficient without consideration of systemicity, frequency and the individual’s particular vulnerability. A speculative risk of harm from fellow prisoners, or evidence of past self-harm without significant psychiatric illness, will not ordinarily make extradition unjust or oppressive.

The appellant challenged an extradition order made by the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court on 13 February 2006. He was wanted in Lithuania for two theft offences and burglary.

He argued that extradition would breach his Convention rights, particularly Article 3, because of alleged police brutality, prison conditions and the risk of reprisals for having acted as an informer. He also relied on his mental condition under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003. The appeal included new expert and psychiatric evidence under section 27 of that Act.

The central issues were whether the new evidence should be admitted, whether extradition created a real Article 3 risk, and whether it would be unjust or oppressive because of the appellant’s mental condition.

1. Fresh evidence. The court admitted the expert and psychiatric evidence. The word “available” in section 27(4) of the Extradition Act 2003 requires a good reason why material was not placed before the District Judge. The strict requirements in Ladd v Marshall need not be applied where liberty and human rights are in issue. An appellant who appears to have kept evidence in reserve should expect scepticism.
2. Article 3 risk. The applicable test was whether there were substantial grounds for believing that the appellant faced a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. The District Judge had stated the correct test but had wrongly referred to the balance of probabilities. That error did not affect the result.
3. Reports of police abuse and poor prison conditions must be kept in context. The assessment requires consideration of the extent to which violations are systemic, their frequency, and whether the individual has a characteristic making him specifically vulnerable. The evidence showed concern about police conduct, but did not establish a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment during the appellant’s temporary police custody. Nor did it establish that prison authorities would be unable or unwilling to protect him from fellow prisoners. The risk remained speculative.
4. The evidence also failed to establish a real risk arising from the appellant’s mental health. The psychiatric report identified vulnerability and a need for increased supervision after self-harm, but no psychiatric illness requiring treatment. His mental state could not properly be described as fragile in a sense involving significant psychiatric harm. The new evidence would not have altered the District Judge’s decision under section 25.
5. The appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal against the extradition order made by the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court on 13 February 2006.