Richards v Government of Ghana

In an extradition appeal, the passage-of-time bar concerns injustice or oppression caused by delay, not general hardship, prison conditions or evidential weakness. A person who deliberately flees the requesting state will ordinarily be unable to rely on subsequent delay, absent an exceptional circumstance creating legitimate security that the case will not be pursued.

Article 3 is absolute, but its minimum level of severity is context-sensitive. Prison conditions must be assessed cumulatively and locally. Article 8 hardship will bar extradition only in circumstances of exceptional severity.

The claimant appealed under section 103 of the Extradition Act 2003 against the Chief Magistrate’s decision to send his case to the Secretary of State for extradition consideration. Ghana sought his extradition to face an attempted-murder charge arising from a 2005 shooting.

The claimant challenged the decision on grounds concerning passage of time, detention conditions in Ghana and interference with private and family life. During the appeal he also relied on a new statutory declaration by the alleged victim, who materially qualified his earlier account. The issues were whether the new evidence affected the section 84 evidential test and whether extradition was barred under sections 82 or 87.

1. Appeal dismissed. Under sections 79 and 82 of the Extradition Act 2003, the passage-of-time inquiry concerns injustice or oppression caused by delay itself. General hardship, prison conditions and evidential sufficiency were irrelevant. The claimant had deliberately fled Ghana, and there was no indication that Ghana had abandoned the prosecution or created legitimate security that it would not pursue it.
2. The fresh evidence did not defeat the section 84 threshold. Although relevant, the alleged victim’s latest statement was outweighed by earlier statements and other witness evidence. A reasonable jury could properly convict, so the case was properly allowed to proceed under section 85.
3. As to Article 3, the court was bound by R (Wellington) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] AC 335, while taking account of Harkins and Edwards v United Kingdom (Application No. 9446/07). Article 3 is absolute, but the minimum level of severity is context-sensitive. Convention standards are not automatically imposed on non-Convention states, and very strong grounds are required before prison conditions there will make extradition incompatible with Article 3.
4. The conditions at Ankaful Prison did not approach that threshold. There was no evidence of intentional debasement or other deliberate ill-treatment; the conditions did not inevitably cause fear, anguish or inferiority; and they had to be assessed in the round. Food, water, medical care, exercise, visits, lighting, ventilation and bedding were available despite crowding, primitive toilet arrangements, mosquitoes and idleness.
5. Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires relevant Strasbourg case law to be taken into account, but does not permit disregard of binding domestic precedent. Article 8 was engaged, but family and business hardship was not exceptionally severe. Bail was extended for 48 hours, subject to conditions, after which the claimant was required to surrender to custody.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal under section 103 of the Extradition Act 2003 dismissed.
• Chief Magistrate: on 2 July 2012, rejected the passage-of-time, Article 3 and Article 8 objections and sent the case to the Secretary of State.