Marr v The Mayor and Burgesses of London Borough of Lambeth & Ors

Claims alleging negligent educational provision require proof of professional breach, not merely inadequate teaching, breach of statutory guidance, or failure to follow a statutory scheme. The Bolam standard applies to teachers and other professionals owing a duty of care. A reasonable educational judgment remains non-negligent even if another approach might have produced greater benefit. Statutory duties concerning special educational needs and excluded pupils do not, without more, create private damages actions. Merely administering an education service does not create a personal duty of care.

The claimant sought damages for alleged negligence by three schools, an educational psychology service and Lambeth LBC during his education. He alleged that his literacy and special educational needs were not identified or addressed, that his behaviour and exclusions resulted from those failures, and that the local education authority failed to secure suitable education after his permanent exclusion.

The defendants denied breach, causation and recoverable loss. The court considered professional negligence, statutory special educational needs duties, provision for excluded pupils, and whether education officers owed a personal duty of care.

1. Claim dismissed. The claimant failed to establish negligence or causation against the schools, educational psychology service or Lambeth LBC officers.
2. The professional negligence test in Phelps v LB Hillingdon [2001] 2 AC 619 applied. The claimant had to show conduct outside the range of responses which responsible professionals could reasonably regard as proper. Failure to follow guidance or OFSTED criticism did not itself establish negligence.
3. The schools made reasonable professional judgments in addressing behaviour, attendance and classroom disruption alongside literacy difficulties. Shortcomings in formal assessment, individual planning, record transfer, referral or continuation of particular programmes did not amount to negligence.
4. The statutory duties concerning special educational needs and excluded pupils did not create damages claims. Under Education Act 1996 s 19, the duty to arrange suitable education was not actionable in damages as breach of statutory duty.
5. The education officers did not owe a personal common-law duty of care. They provided administrative information, assumed no special responsibility and gave no substantive educational advice. The unusual waiting-list decision might have been amenable to judicial review, but did not found a negligence action.
6. Causation was independently unproved. The claim was dismissed.