Steblins v Government of Latvia

Under section 11(3)(b) of the Extradition Act 1989, the court must discharge an applicant if, having regard to all the circumstances, the passage of time makes return unjust or oppressive. The court has no residual discretion once that condition is met.

“Unjust” primarily concerns prejudice to the accused and the fairness of the trial. “Oppressive” concerns hardship caused by changes in the accused’s circumstances. The assessment is fact-sensitive. Delay, the applicant’s conduct, the seriousness of the offence, personal circumstances and the causative connection between delay and hardship must be considered. Routine disruption caused by extradition is insufficient.

The claimant sought habeas corpus against his extradition to Latvia for burglary and conspiracy to steal. The request had been made under the Extradition Act 1989, because it pre-dated the Extradition Act 2003.

The offence was committed in 1996 when the claimant was nearly 18. He left Latvia later that year and claimed asylum in the United Kingdom. Although the extradition request was made in 2001, an arrest warrant was not issued until 2005. The central issue was whether the passage of time made return unjust or oppressive under section 11(3)(b).

1. Application refused. The claimant was not entitled to discharge under section 11(3)(b) of the Extradition Act 1989.
2. The court accepted the governing principles: time is measured from commission of the offence to the habeas corpus hearing; where return would be unjust or oppressive the applicant must be discharged; delay attributable to the requesting state generally assists the applicant, while inevitable delay does not; and delay caused by fleeing, concealment or evasion will ordinarily not assist the applicant except in the most exceptional circumstances.
3. “Unjust” concerns principally prejudice to the accused and the conduct of the trial. “Oppressive” concerns hardship arising from changes in the accused’s circumstances. In either case, the injustice or oppression must be causatively linked to the passage of time.
4. The assessment is necessarily fact-sensitive. Authorities are of limited assistance in determining whether return is oppressive in an individual case. The court considered the ten-year delay, the claimant’s age when the offence was committed, the offence’s seriousness, his lack of Latvian, his life and work in the United Kingdom, and the disruption caused by return.
5. The delay was substantial, and the loss of the file by the Crown Prosecution Service was regrettable. However, the claimant had left Latvia in breach of a residence condition, and his departure was the primary cause of the early delay. The evidence did not establish particularly significant disadvantage or hardship beyond the routine disruption inevitably associated with extradition. The claimant remained relatively young and his ties to the United Kingdom were not unusually strong.
6. There was a strong public interest arising from reciprocal extradition arrangements in returning a person who admitted committing an offence in Latvia to that country for trial or other proceedings. The court therefore refused the application.
7. The Secretary of State was still required to consider the matter under section 12 of the 1989 Act. That discretion enabled consideration of the claimant’s wider immigration circumstances, which were not fully before the court. There was no order as to costs.