Parasiliti- Mollica v Prosecutor General (Court of Appeal of Reggio Calabria, Italy)

For a post-conviction European arrest warrant, section 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 does not require an express statement that the person is unlawfully at large. It is sufficient if the warrant, read as a whole, makes that position ascertainable. The statutory concept in section 68A is independent of speciality.

Section 14 requires a fact-sensitive assessment of whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of delay. There is no fixed time limit. The principal focus is the effect of delay on the person concerned, rather than criticism of the requesting state’s efficiency. Delay caused or materially contributed to by the person’s own flight cannot ordinarily support the claim. Ordinary hardship and family disruption do not readily satisfy the high threshold.

The appellant challenged the District Judge’s order for his extradition to Italy under two European arrest warrants. One warrant concerned a sentence for drug trafficking. The other concerned in absentia convictions for theft-related offending and cultivation of cannabis.

The appeal raised two issues under the Extradition Act 2003: whether the warrants complied with section 2, particularly whether they showed that the appellant was unlawfully at large; and whether extradition was barred under section 14 because of the passage of time, including the appellant’s earlier extradition to Italy, his settled life in the United Kingdom, and delay by the Italian authorities.

1. Section 2. The appeal on validity failed. A Part 1 warrant need not state in express terms that the person is unlawfully at large. Following R (on the application of Kuprevicius) v Vice Minister of Justice Ministry of Justice Lithuania [2006] EWHC 1518 (Admin), the question is whether the warrant’s contents, taken as a whole, permit that inference.
2. The warrants identified enforceable convictions, custodial sentences and remaining periods of imprisonment. That information showed that extradition was sought to execute custodial sentences. It therefore satisfied section 68A of the Extradition Act 2003. The statutory concept of being unlawfully at large is independent of speciality and is assessed by reference to the statutory requirements and the warrant when issued.
3. Section 14. The appellant failed to establish that extradition would be unjust or oppressive. The inquiry is fact-sensitive. There is no automatic cut-off point, and the burden lies on the appellant on the balance of probabilities. Delay caused by fleeing, concealing whereabouts or evading arrest cannot ordinarily be relied on. Culpable delay may be relevant, particularly in a marginal case, but the principal focus is the effect of time passing.
4. The appellant’s relationship, employment, family hardship, age at the time of offending and the consequences of his previous extradition did not, individually or cumulatively, reach the required threshold. He had not been lulled into believing that the outstanding sentences would not be enforced, and the District Judge had found that he knew the Italian authorities were pursuing enforcement.
5. The observations in R v Bow Street Magistrates Court, ex parte Lloyd [2003] EWHC 2294 (Admin) concerned a different statutory regime and did not assist. Secchi v Deputy Prosecutor of the Republic of Italy [2010] EWHC 521 (Admin) was fact-sensitive and provided no basis for a different conclusion.
6. The appeal was dismissed.

High Court (Administrative Court): The court dismissed the appeal against the District Judge’s order for extradition under two European arrest warrants.