Secchi v Deputy Prosecutor of the Republic of Italy

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, the passage of time bars extradition only where extradition would be unjust or oppressive because of that delay. The court must assess the whole circumstances, including the seriousness of the offending, the requested person’s knowledge of the conviction and sentence, any responsibility for remaining unavailable, and culpable delay by the requesting state where the case is close to the borderline. A person need not be a classic fugitive before personal responsibility for delay becomes relevant. Ordinary hardship, including disruption to family life, does not ordinarily reach the statutory threshold. The threshold of oppression is high and was not met on these facts.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a District Judge’s order for his extradition to Italy. The order concerned four European Arrest Warrants relating to convictions for fraud and extortion offences, with an aggregate sentence of three years and eight months. The appellant argued that extradition was barred by the passage of time under section 14 and would interfere with his private and family life under Article 8. A further matter concerning credit for custody in France was raised, but the court held that it did not satisfy the statutory conditions for introducing a new issue or evidence on appeal. The central issue was whether extradition had become unjust or oppressive by reason of the delay.

The appeal was dismissed. The Divisional Court held that the District Judge had applied the correct principles and was entitled to order extradition.

1. Section 14 requires an assessment of whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of the passage of time. The court applied the principles originating in Kakis v the Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1971] 1 WLR 779. A classic fugitive who creates the delay by fleeing justice cannot rely on that delay. The statutory inquiry is not confined to classic fugitives, however. The appellant knew of the Milan conviction and sentence, knew that he was wanted, and had chosen to live in the hope that he would not be found. He was therefore not blameless, although he had not concealed his whereabouts or actively evaded arrest.

2. The court applied the guidance in Gomes and Goodyear [2009] UKHL 21. Relevant considerations included the seriousness of the offending and, where the case is close to or on the borderline of oppression, culpable delay by the requesting state. The appellant’s repeated and financially serious offending weighed heavily against the appeal. Any delay attributable to changes in Italian sentencing law or internal lack of co-ordination did not bring the case near the borderline.

3. The District Judge was entitled to calculate the delay from the 2001 conviction rather than the later 2007 activation of the suspended sentences. He was also entitled to take account of the appellant’s right to seek retrials in respect of three convictions entered in his absence.

4. Family disruption and other hardship did not amount to oppression under section 14. The Article 8 submission did not provide an independent basis for refusing extradition. The late material concerning custody in France did not satisfy section 27(4), and no liberty to apply was granted.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal against the District Judge’s order for extradition.
• District Judge: Ordered extradition to Italy after rejecting the section 14 passage-of-time argument.