Jedrzejczyk v Circuit Court In Olsztyn, Poland

[2012] EWHC 400 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2012] EWHC 400 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
29 February 2012
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative Extradition Oppression through delay
Keywords
extradition European Arrest Warrant evading arrest oppression passage of time s14 fugitive status delay
Outcome
appeal dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

For the purpose of the statutory bar based on oppression through delay, a person who has deliberately evaded arrest is generally precluded from relying on the passage of time, save in the most exceptional circumstances. Evading arrest may be established by proper inference from the totality of the evidence; positive acts of concealment or a formal finding of flight are not essential. In assessing oppression, the court must consider all relevant circumstances in the round, including the conduct causing delay, family life, visits to the requesting state, the age and seriousness of the allegations, and any culpable delay by the requesting authority. The threshold is very high, and ordinary hardship arising from extradition and the establishment of family life in the United Kingdom will not ordinarily suffice.

Factual background

The appellant challenged an order made by District Judge Evans at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 3 August 2011 for her extradition to Poland under a European Arrest Warrant concerning three alleged dishonesty offences dating from 2001. She argued that the district judge had wrongly found that she had evaded arrest, had wrongly treated that finding as preventing reliance on the statutory oppression bar, and had wrongly concluded that extradition would not be oppressive.

The High Court considered whether the findings of evasion were properly available on the evidence, what consequence such a finding had for the statutory bar, and whether the circumstances nevertheless made extradition oppressive.

Held

  1. The appeal was dismissed. The district judge was entitled to draw inferences from the evidence as a whole, including adverse credibility findings. His reasoning amounted to proper inference rather than speculation.
  2. The findings that the appellant left Poland shortly after being questioned and providing handwriting samples, closed her business, left her family, entered the United Kingdom as a tourist and overstayed, and knew of continuing police interest entitled the district judge to construe her conduct as evading arrest. A formal finding that she had fled Poland or concealed her whereabouts was unnecessary.
  3. Secchi v Italy [2010] EWHC 521 (Admin) and Boismard v Poland [2011] EWHC 1454 (Admin) were distinguishable on their facts. Here, the finding of evasion brought the case within the principle that, under s14, the court will not ordinarily apply the bar in the case of a fugitive, save in the most exceptional circumstances.
  4. Oppression had to be assessed in the round. The appellant’s long residence, family life, work, clean record, the age and value of the allegations, visits to Poland and the requesting authority’s delay did not meet the very high threshold. The requesting authority had not been guilty of unjustified delay, and this was not a borderline case.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  • High Court (Administrative Court): Dismissed the appeal from the extradition order made by District Judge Evans at the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 3 August 2011.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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