Meadow v General Medical Council

An expert witness has immunity from disciplinary proceedings based solely on evidence honestly and in good faith given, or prepared for use, in court. The immunity is required to protect the administration of justice and applies even where the evidence is negligent or mistaken. It is subject to a narrow exception: the judge, or appellate court, may refer conduct to the relevant professional body where the shortcomings are sufficiently serious to justify possible restriction or removal from practice.

Absent bad faith or recklessness, a finding of serious professional misconduct requires lapses of an exceptional degree. Honest but mistaken expert evidence will rarely satisfy that threshold.

Professor Sir Roy Meadow appealed against a decision of the General Medical Council’s Fitness to Practise Panel. The Panel had found serious professional misconduct and ordered erasure from the medical register after concluding that he had misused statistical evidence in the criminal trial of Sally Clark.

The appeal raised whether disciplinary proceedings could be based on evidence given by an expert witness in court, and, alternatively, whether the statistical errors and failure to identify the limits of his expertise justified a finding of serious professional misconduct and erasure.

1. Immunity. The appeal against the finding of serious professional misconduct was allowed because the complaint was based on statements prepared for, and evidence given in, court proceedings. Witness immunity rests on the public interest in allowing witnesses to give evidence freely and without fear of subsequent proceedings. That rationale applies to disciplinary proceedings as well as civil claims.
2. The immunity is not blanket. It protects complaints by parties or others affected by the evidence, whether or not bad faith or dishonesty is alleged. A judge, or the Court of Appeal where appropriate, may refer an expert to the relevant professional body where the conduct falls so far below the required standard that disciplinary action, restriction of practice or removal from practice may be warranted. The witness must have an opportunity to make representations before referral. Ordinarily, honest and good-faith evidence will not justify referral.
3. Alternatively, the Panel’s finding could not stand. Conduct outside ordinary clinical practice may constitute serious professional misconduct where it is sufficiently connected with the medical profession and seriously damages public confidence. Bad faith is unnecessary, but negligence must be of a high degree. In the absence of bad faith, serious professional misconduct will be justified only in a very rare case and the lapses must be serious indeed.
4. The appellant had honestly relied on his understanding of statistical material. His failure to make clear that he was not a statistician could properly be criticised, but the statistical mistake was readily made and did not justify the Panel’s conclusion. The Panel had also treated the prosecutor’s fallacy and the appellant’s eminence unfairly.
5. An appeal under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 is not limited to review, but the court will not interfere unless the decision is clearly wrong. The finding and sanction were clearly wrong. The appeal was allowed on all grounds.

The judgment does not state the citation of any lower decision in the present disciplinary proceedings. The appeal to the High Court was allowed on all grounds.