Island Farm Development Ltd, R. (on the application of) v Bridgend County Borough Council

A local authority may retain land for future economic and employment purposes even where it has received a substantial offer and its refusal prevents development authorised by planning permission. Local Government Act 1972, section 123(2), prohibits disposal below the best consideration reasonably obtainable without consent; it does not require a disposal. Councillors may hold political views or a predisposition against a development, including views expressed in an election manifesto, provided they genuinely consider all material considerations and remain willing to change their minds. Prior public statements and party policy do not establish predetermination without positive evidence of a closed mind. The court should not substitute its assessment for a rational and informed evaluation by the authority.

Island Farm Development Ltd challenged Bridgend County Borough Council’s decision to retain its land at Island Farm rather than sell it for a development involving a Welsh Rugby Union school of excellence, employment land, housing and related facilities. Planning permission had been granted, but no binding agreement for sale had been completed. Following a change in political control, the Council reviewed the proposed disposal and resolved to retain the land for possible future high-technology employment use.

The claim alleged predetermination and apparent bias, errors of fact and analysis, irrationality, and breach of the Council’s duties concerning land disposal. The central issues were whether the Cabinet had approached the decision with a closed mind and whether its assessment of the long-term public and economic benefits was legally irrational.

1. The claim was dismissed. The Council was entitled to retain the land and was not required to sell merely because a valuable offer existed. Section 123(2) of the Local Government Act 1972 imposed a condition on any disposal, not a duty to dispose. The Council could consider the future economic well-being of the area and the need to preserve land for high-technology employment.
2. Councillors may approach a decision with a legitimate predisposition arising from political policy or publicly expressed views. They must nevertheless consider all relevant matters, weigh the competing arguments, and remain open to changing their minds. There was no apparent bias or predetermination because the evidence showed that the Cabinet members had considered the options and relevant material. Prior opposition to the development, party policy and election commitments were insufficient to establish a closed mind.
3. The decision was an asset-management decision, not a planning or regulatory decision. Planning permission did not guarantee that the development would proceed, and the Council had no duty to facilitate it absent an enforceable agreement. The effect on the claimants and the existence of planning permission were relevant, but could be outweighed by the Council’s assessment of the community interest.
4. The report’s treatment of the employment land, potential funding and future demand was not materially flawed. The Cabinet was entitled to prefer the informed and expert view of its economic development officer over alternative valuation evidence. The assessment that future development remained reasonably possible was not irrational or mere speculation.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. Permission was initially refused on the papers by Sullivan J on 27 May 2005, but limited permission was granted by Mr Michael Supperstone QC, sitting as a deputy judge, on 28 September 2005. The claim was dismissed by Collins J.