The Spitalfields Historic Building Trust, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Tower Hamlets

A local authority may use standing orders to regulate committee members’ entitlement to vote on deferred planning applications. The power in paragraph 42 of Schedule 12 to the Local Government Act 1972 extends beyond meeting procedure in a narrow sense. It covers the substantive work of a committee and the manner in which that work is conducted, including voting arrangements.

A rule restricting voting at resumed consideration to members who attended the earlier meeting may therefore be lawful where it rationally promotes continuity and informed decision-making. Specific statutory voting exclusions do not form an exhaustive code. The rule remains subject to express statutory requirements and ordinary public law controls against irrationality.

The Trust sought judicial review of the Council’s decision to grant planning permission for a mixed-use development at the former Old Truman Brewery site. The High Court dismissed three grounds of challenge, including the contention that members who had not attended the earlier meeting were unlawfully prevented from voting. Morris J. held that the Council’s deferred-meeting voting rule was authorised by paragraph 42 of Schedule 12 to the Local Government Act 1972.

The Trust appealed on that issue. The central question was whether standing orders regulating the Council’s proceedings and business could restrict voting on a deferred application to members who had attended the previous meeting. The respondents also advanced alternative arguments concerning committee composition and sub-delegation.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Council’s standing order was lawful, and the planning permission was validly granted.
2. Paragraph 42 of Schedule 12 to the Local Government Act 1972 is broad in scope. “Regulation” bears its ordinary meaning of controlling something by rules. “Proceedings and business” extends to the substance of matters considered by a committee, the conduct of its decision-making, and rules governing that conduct. It therefore includes standing orders restricting voting in specified circumstances.
3. Paragraph 39(1) of Schedule 12 establishes majority voting by members who are present and vote. It does not prescribe which members may vote and does not limit the power in paragraph 42. The general entitlement to vote is capable of modification by valid standing orders.
4. The Council’s rule served a rational purpose. Requiring attendance at the earlier meeting promoted continuity and ensured that members voting on resumed consideration had heard the earlier discussion. The related rule requiring attendance throughout consideration at one meeting served the same purpose. Neither rule was arbitrary or unjustifiably undemocratic.
5. The specific statutory exclusions from voting, including those concerning pecuniary interests, outstanding council tax and non-councillor committee members, were mandatory restrictions but did not exhaust the circumstances in which voting could be restricted by standing order. Section 31(10) of the Localism Act 2011 had no wider implication.
6. The requirement of political balance under section 15 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 was not in principle incompatible with the rule. In some cases maintaining the same political proportions at the resumed meeting might not be reasonably practicable, but continuity arrangements could still be rational and lawful.
7. The alternative arguments that the rule altered committee composition or operated as a sub-delegation were unnecessary to decide.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — [2023] EWCA Civ 917: appeal dismissed.
• High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Planning Court — Morris J. dismissed the judicial review claim on all three grounds, including the challenge to the deferred-meeting voting rule: [2022] EWHC 2262 (Admin).