Lovelock, R (on the application of) v Surrey Heath District Council

Planning policy requiring parking provision must be interpreted in the light of current national policy. An inspector must identify whether material considerations justify departing from the development plan and must give adequate reasons. Planning Policy Guidance Note 13 and Planning Policy Guidance Note 3 promote sustainable transport by discouraging excessive parking provision; they do not make satisfactory alternative public transport a precondition for reduced parking. In a housing conversion, insisting on a minimum parking space merely to meet a potential occupier’s preference is generally inconsistent with that policy, absent exceptional considerations such as highway safety or material harm to other amenity. A decision based on a materially incorrect interpretation of national policy is unlawful and may be quashed.

The claimant challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 an inspector’s dismissal of his appeal against refusal of permission to subdivide an existing dwelling into two self-contained homes. The refusal concerned the absence of an allocated parking space for the proposed additional dwelling and relied on policy M7 of the local plan. The claimant argued that subsequent national and structure-plan policies had moved from minimum to maximum or flexible parking standards. The central issue was whether the inspector had properly interpreted those policies and lawfully treated the local plan policy as requiring an additional parking space.

1. Decision quashed. Judgment was entered for the claimant and the inspector’s decision was quashed.
2. Under section 70(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, the inspector had to determine the appeal having regard to the development plan and all material considerations. She had to interpret national policy correctly, apply it, or give reasons for departing from it, and provide adequate and intelligible reasons addressing the principal issues.
3. The court held that PPG 13 and PPG 3 were directed towards reducing dependence on private cars. Their approach was not one of generally insisting on minimum parking standards. They contemplated maximum standards and discouraged provision beyond what developers or prospective occupiers wanted, subject to exceptional circumstances such as unresolved highway-safety implications.
4. The inspector wrongly treated satisfactory alternative public transport as defining the circumstances in which parking provision could be reduced. The guidance also identified housing conversions, where off-street parking was less likely to be successfully designed into the scheme, as a relevant circumstance. That consideration was directly applicable but had not been addressed.
5. Absent a highway objection or comparable evidence of congestion, harm to a conservation area, or harm to other amenity, refusal of a housing conversion because one additional space was not provided was difficult to reconcile with the national guidance. The inspector’s conclusion that the local plan and national guidance were to similar effect showed that she had misunderstood and misapplied them. The claimant was awarded costs assessed by agreement at £6,500.

The inspector dismissed the claimant’s planning appeal by decision letter dated 11 January 2006. The Administrative Court allowed the statutory challenge under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, entered judgment for the claimant and quashed the decision. Permission to appeal was refused by the Deputy High Court Judge; any application had to be made to the Court of Appeal.