Wiltshire Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

On a challenge under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the weight given to material planning considerations is for the inspector, subject to irrationality. The High Court must avoid turning a statutory challenge into a rehearing on planning merits. A decision letter is read fairly, practically and as a whole. It need address the principal controversial issues and need not rehearse every argument. A challenge based on inadequate reasons succeeds only where the reasons are unintelligible or the claimant has suffered substantial prejudice. Where the claim has no realistic prospect of success and no compelling reason for trial, summary disposal may be appropriate.

Wiltshire Council challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 an Inspector’s decision allowing Robert Hitchins Ltd’s appeal under section 78 and granting planning permission for residential development in Calne. The Council argued that the Inspector had misunderstood or failed to apply the statutory development plan, particularly the policy of disaggregating housing requirements, and had failed adequately to address earlier planning decisions. Robert Hitchins Ltd applied to strike out or summarily dispose of the claim. The central issue was whether the claim disclosed a realistic prospect of success.

1. Application granted. The section 288 claim was summarily disposed of against the Council. The preferable procedural basis was CPR Part 24.2, although the application had been made under CPR Part 3.4(2)(a).
2. The statutory challenge did not permit a rehearing of planning merits. The weight given to a material planning consideration was a matter of planning judgment for the Inspector, provided all material considerations were taken into account and the conclusion was not Wednesbury unreasonable. Where an expert tribunal is the fact-finding body, irrationality presents a particularly difficult obstacle.
3. The Inspector’s decision letter had to be read in good faith and as a whole, in a practical and straightforward manner. It was unnecessary to examine it as if construing a contract or statute, or to require an answer to every argument. The reasons had to identify the conclusions on the principal important controversial issues and disclose how significant questions of law or fact were resolved.
4. The Inspector had understood the competing positions on housing-land disaggregation. He recognised that the Council could demonstrate five years’ supply only if disaggregation applied, noted that the principle was implicit in the emerging regional strategy and structure plan but absent from PPS3, and explained why the earlier appeal decisions were distinguishable. Whether those distinctions were correct was not enough to establish an error of law.
5. The Inspector had also considered the alternative assumption that disaggregation was appropriate. On that footing, the proposed development would contribute to the supply required beyond the first five years and supported the flexibility required by PPS3. That alternative reasoning independently showed that the alleged error could not affect the outcome.
6. The Council’s claim was therefore bound to fail. The public-interest argument based on avoiding delay added nothing to the merits of the application.

First-instance judicial review proceedings under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The claim was summarily disposed of against the Council.