Prancs v Rezekne Court of Latvia

On an appeal under the Extradition Act 2003, oppression requires more than the ordinary hardship of extradition, even where the requested person has mental-health difficulties. The court must address the statutory question under section 25: whether the person’s condition makes extradition unjust or oppressive. Delay caused by the person’s own flight or evasion cannot ordinarily found an objection under section 14. Article 3 requires strong grounds for believing that return creates a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. Article 6 requires a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the receiving state. An unwilling witness statement, without more, does not establish such a denial.

This was an appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against District Judge Evans’s order for the claimant’s extradition to Latvia. The European Arrest Warrant alleged that the claimant had intentionally inflicted serious bodily injuries in Latvia in 1999.

The appeal relied on the claimant’s mental condition and alleged custodial conditions, the passage of time, and compatibility with Articles 3 and 6 of the ECHR. The claimant argued that extradition would be oppressive, that the delay was unacceptable, and that the complainant’s unwillingness to participate would prevent a fair trial.

1. Appeal dismissed. Under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003, the court could intervene only if the District Judge ought to have decided a relevant question differently and that different decision would have required discharge.
2. Section 25 required the court to determine whether the claimant’s physical or mental condition made extradition unjust or oppressive. The question was not simply whether he suffered from a psychiatric disorder. The court applied the guidance in Bhoudiba v Central Examining Court No 5 of the National Court of Justice, Madrid, Spain [2006] EWHC 167 Admin.
3. The distinction between unjustness and oppression in Kakis v The Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 was relevant. Oppression involved hardship of a demanding kind. Ordinary hardship on return, even when increased by mental-health or personal problems, was insufficient. The District Judge was entitled to assess the psychiatric evidence, the evidence concerning Latvian detention conditions, and more recent material concerning Latvia.
4. Section 14 did not bar extradition because the delay was caused by the claimant’s own conduct. The District Judge was entitled to reject the claimant’s account and find that he had signed an undertaking to remain at his address and had left Latvia to evade the criminal proceedings. The proceedings were pursued promptly once his whereabouts became known.
5. For Article 3, the claimant had to show strong grounds for believing that return created a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, applying Ullah v Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 AC. The evidence did not establish the necessary minimum level of severity. Although medical or custodial conditions may in an appropriate case engage Article 3, as illustrated by Aerts v Belgium 25357/94, they did not do so here.
6. For Article 6, the claimant had to establish a flagrant denial of a fair trial in Latvia. The complainant’s statement that he did not wish to participate showed only that he was unwilling when the statement was made. It did not establish that he would refuse to testify at trial or that Latvian procedures could not secure his attendance or permit the use of absent-witness evidence. The Article 6 ground therefore failed.

Mr Justice Bean agreed with Lord Justice Maurice Kay. The appeal was dismissed, with an application for Community Legal Services funding assessment.

• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal against District Judge Evans’s extradition order dated 4 September 2006.