Hargobind Tahilramani (also known as Gobind Lal Tahil) v Government of the USA

An extradition appeal is concerned with whether the district judge’s decision was wrong, not with rehearing the evidence. Appellate courts should respect factual and evaluative findings unless the overall assessment was wrong.

Article 3 requires a real and individual risk of prohibited treatment. Where violence is threatened by non-state actors, the question is whether the receiving state can provide reasonable protection; no guarantee of absolute safety is required. Protective segregation is not inherently inhuman or degrading.

Section 81(b) requires a reasonable chance or serious possibility of prejudice by reason of a listed characteristic. Section 91 requires an overall assessment of mental condition, suicide risk and preventative arrangements. The domestic statutory test is not expanded by the CJEU’s approach in EDL.

The applicant challenged the decision of the Senior District Judge to send his extradition case to the Secretary of State under section 87(3) of the Extradition Act 2003. The Secretary of State ordered extradition to the United States.

The appeal concerned alleged risks of sexual violence and protective detention under Articles 3 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, alleged prejudice by reason of nationality or sexual orientation under section 81(b), the admission of fresh evidence and new grounds, and oppression arising from mental illness and suicide risk under section 91.

The central issue was whether the district judge had reached conclusions that were legally or evaluatively wrong.

1. Appeal test. Applying Love v Government of the USA, the court held that an extradition appeal is not a rehearing. The appellate court must decide whether the district judge was wrong, while respecting findings based on oral evidence. An overall evaluation may be overturned where crucial factors should have been weighed so differently that the decision was wrong.
2. Articles 3 and 14. The district judge was entitled to find that the United States could provide reasonable protection against inter-prisoner violence, including through an I-Unit or Special Housing Unit. Article 3 does not require a guarantee of absolute safety. Protective detention was for a legitimate purpose, subject to review, and was not inherently solitary confinement or inhuman or degrading treatment. The Article 14 challenge failed because any differential treatment would arise from vulnerability and protective measures, not sexual orientation as such, and would pursue a legitimate aim.
3. Section 81(b). The applicable threshold was a reasonable chance or serious possibility of prejudice. The evidence did not establish a real prospect of harsher treatment in CAR prisons by reason of foreign nationality. Section 81(b) did not convert concerns about ordinary detention conditions into a statutory bar. The sexual-orientation argument also failed because any protective detention would be for the applicant’s safety.
4. Fresh evidence and grounds. The proposed new grounds were refused. The evidence was weak, outdated, speculative, irrelevant or available at first instance. Fresh evidence generally had to be unavailable at the extradition hearing and decisive. The applicant had been represented by experienced lawyers and had not adequately explained the late amendment.
5. Section 91. The district judge properly applied the domestic test under section 91. The evidence supported findings that the applicant was not seriously unwell, had a low clinical suicide risk and would have access to adequate preventative arrangements. The broader approach in EDL was not imported into section 91. No further assurances were required. The district judge’s conclusions were open to him. Permission to appeal was refused.

• Senior District Judge: On 5 June 2023, ordered the case to be sent to the Secretary of State under section 87(3) of the Extradition Act 2003.
• Secretary of State: Ordered extradition to the United States on 17 July 2023.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Refused permission to appeal after a rolled-up permission and appeal hearing.