Turner v Government of the USA

In a suicide-risk extradition case, Extradition Act 2003, section 91 requires an overall factual judgment under a high threshold. The court must assess whether the requested person’s mental condition creates a substantial risk of suicide, removes the capacity to resist the impulse to commit suicide, and leaves a sufficiently great risk of successful suicide despite appropriate protective arrangements.

Fresh evidence on appeal must be decisive: it must have been unavailable at the extradition hearing and would have required a different decision resulting in discharge. A suicide risk arising from a rational and voluntary choice to avoid extradition will not, without loss of capacity to resist that choice, establish oppression.

The appellant, a United Kingdom citizen, was sought by the United States to stand trial in Florida for causing death by dangerous driving while under the influence of drink or drugs. District Judge Purdy rejected objections based on passage of time and ill-health, and sent the case to the Secretary of State under the Extradition Act 2003. The Secretary of State subsequently ordered extradition.

On her statutory appeal, the appellant relied on psychiatric evidence obtained after the extradition hearing. It described depression, post-traumatic symptoms and a high risk of suicide if extradition proceeded. During the appeal she took an overdose and was later admitted voluntarily to a psychiatric facility. The central issue was whether the new evidence showed that extradition would be oppressive because of her mental condition and suicide risk.

Decision

1. The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal. Aikens LJ held, and Globe J agreed, that the new evidence was not decisive evidence that the District Judge would have found extradition unjust or oppressive under section 91(2) of the Extradition Act 2003.

2. The court applied the established suicide-risk principles. The inquiry is fact-sensitive and subject to a high threshold. The court must assess the relationship between the person’s mental condition and the risk of suicide, including whether the condition removes the capacity to resist the impulse to commit suicide. It must also assess the residual risk of a successful suicide despite reasonable protective measures, the facilities in the requesting state, and the public interest in honouring extradition treaty obligations.

3. The fresh-evidence condition in section 104(4) required more than evidence which was new in time. Applying Fenyvesi v Hungarian Judicial Authorities [2009] EWHC 231 (Admin), the evidence had to be unavailable with reasonable diligence and decisive: it had to require the District Judge to decide the relevant question differently and to discharge the appellant.

4. The court accepted that the appellant had a delicate and deteriorating mental condition, and that extradition could increase the risk of a further suicide attempt. It nevertheless found that she remained rational. Her overdose and stated intention to die if extradited reflected a voluntary choice to avoid extradition, rather than a mental condition which deprived her of the capacity to resist a suicidal impulse.

5. Risk-management measures could reduce the danger during any period in United Kingdom custody. The evidence also established that Florida had suitable facilities to manage both her mental illness and suicide risk. The high threshold for oppression was therefore not met, and the appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court) — dismissed the appellant’s appeal under section 103 of the Extradition Act 2003: [2012] EWHC 2426 (Admin).

• Secretary of State — on 28 June 2011, ordered the appellant’s extradition.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court (District Judge Purdy) — on 5 May 2011, rejected the appellant’s passage-of-time and ill-health objections and sent her case to the Secretary of State under section 87(3) of the Extradition Act 2003.