Justin Matthew Ward v The Government of The United States of America

On an extradition appeal, the High Court must decide whether the district judge was wrong, rather than conduct a rehearing or undertake a fresh evaluation of all evidence.

Delay may be oppressive only after considering all the circumstances, including any culpable delay by the requesting state, any resulting sense of security, the seriousness of the alleged offending and the effect of the delay. A requested person’s difficult medical condition does not make extradition oppressive merely because treatment in the requesting state is less desirable than treatment in the United Kingdom, where reliable assurances establish that appropriate care will be available.

The residual abuse-of-process jurisdiction is exceptional. It requires cogent evidence of conduct which usurps or impugns the integrity of the statutory extradition regime and causes relevant prejudice.

The United States sought the appellant’s extradition under Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 to prosecute an alleged sexual offence committed in Florida in 2004. Following a hearing in the Westminster Magistrates’ Court, the district judge rejected challenges based on delay, abuse of process and other statutory and Convention grounds, and sent the case to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State ordered extradition.

Limited leave to appeal was granted on delay under section 82 and abuse of process. After the original hearing, the appellant sought to rely on fresh medical evidence and to add a ground under section 91, while also seeking to reopen other grounds. The central questions were whether the fresh evidence justified procedural amendments, whether extradition was unjust or oppressive because of delay or medical condition, and whether the proceedings constituted an abuse of process.

1. Appeal and fresh evidence. The court refused leave to amend the grounds, declined to receive the proposed fresh evidence, refused to reopen the previously refused grounds, and dismissed the appeal. The proposed medical evidence did not satisfy the applicable criteria for fresh evidence and did not materially alter the appeal.
2. Medical condition. Section 91 requires discharge or adjournment only where the person’s physical or mental condition makes extradition unjust or oppressive. The court distinguished what was desirable for the appellant, including reversal of his colostomy in his local hospital, from what could legally make extradition oppressive. The procedure was not guaranteed to occur in the United Kingdom, continuity of care was not medically necessary, and the respondent gave clear assurances that the appellant could be screened, transported, housed and treated in the United States. His psychiatric medication would be available. The evidence did not establish that his mental condition removed his capacity to resist suicide. Section 91 was therefore not engaged.
3. Passage of time. The section 82 question required an overall assessment. Culpable delay by a requesting state may be relevant, particularly with a resulting sense of security, but courts should not generally investigate the requesting state’s internal procedures, resources or prioritisation absent bad faith. The appellant’s own words showed that he expected proceedings in the United States, and the district judge was entitled to reject his contrary account. The delay, considered with all other circumstances, was not oppressive.
4. 2007 Guidance. The guidance concerned prosecutorial consultation in concurrent-jurisdiction cases. It created no third-party rights, did not determine which country should prosecute, and could not replace the statutory forum bar. It was inapplicable because the CPS had never been seized of the United States allegations as prosecutor. Even if it had been bypassed, following it would not necessarily have prevented prosecution in the United States.
5. Abuse of process. The residual jurisdiction is available only in very limited circumstances. It requires cogent evidence that the requesting authority usurped the statutory regime or impugned its integrity, together with relevant prejudice. It cannot circumvent statutory bars or provide relief after a near miss on those bars. No such evidence existed. The district judge was entitled to reject the abuse challenge.
6. The appeal was dismissed. The appellant’s solicitors were directed to provide the respondent with the medical records and reports relevant to fitness for removal and appropriate care.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: The district judge rejected the appellant’s challenges to extradition and sent the case to the Secretary of State under section 87(3) of the Extradition Act 2003.
• Secretary of State for the Home Department: Extradition to the United States was ordered on 19 October 2022.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Limited appeal grounds concerning delay and abuse of process were rejected. Fresh evidence and proposed additional grounds were also refused.