Lynch, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Lambeth

A defective homelessness decision under section 184 of the Housing Act 1996 is not necessarily a nullity. The statutory review under section 202, including the additional safeguard in regulation 8(2), may remedy legal or procedural defects, followed by the statutory appeal under section 204. Judicial review remains available only exceptionally where the statutory route provides a suitable alternative.

A housing authority is not required to define every aspect of medical or welfare priority in precise detail. An allocation scheme is lawful if it explains the allocation process, identifies the relevant categories and permits reasonable preference to be given to applicants in greater need. Procedural errors justify relief only where they caused material prejudice or could have affected the outcome.

The claimant, a tenant of Lambeth, sought judicial review of homelessness and housing-allocation decisions. She contended that her section 184 decision was unlawful because it failed to address whether it was reasonable for her to continue occupying an inaccessible second-floor flat in light of the family’s medical and welfare needs.

She also challenged the section 202 review, alleging inadequate inquiries, procedural unfairness and excessive reliance on the authority’s medical adviser. Finally, she challenged Lambeth’s allocation scheme and its assessment that she did not qualify for Group F welfare referral, arguing that the scheme failed to give proper effect to medical and disability-related need under Part VI of the Housing Act 1996.

1. Homelessness decision and statutory alternative. The section 184 letter gave an inadequate reason because it did not address the central question under section 175(3) of the Housing Act 1996. It was defective, but not a nullity. The section 202 review procedure and regulation 8(2) of the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedure and Amendment) Regulations 1996 provided a further opportunity to make representations and could remedy the defect. The statutory route, including the section 204 appeal, was therefore a suitable alternative to judicial review.
2. Review procedure and prejudice. Lambeth had failed to comply with certain time limits and notification requirements. Nevertheless, the claimant received a detailed minded-to letter and could make further representations. A reviewing officer is not presumed incapable of changing an initial view; the statutory scheme assumes that the officer can reconsider the case fairly. The procedural errors caused no material prejudice and did not justify quashing the review decision.
3. Inquiries, disclosure and rationality. The authority had been given extensive medical and occupational-therapy material and did not dispute the medical evidence. No specific further inquiry was identified which a reasonable authority was legally required to make. The medical adviser’s report did not have to be disclosed as a precondition of legality, and fairness depended on the issue and circumstances. The reviewing officer was entitled to conclude that wheelchair accommodation was not presently required and that it remained reasonable for the claimant to occupy her accommodation. The decision was not Wednesbury unreasonable.
4. Allocation scheme. Part VI did not require every welfare or disability circumstance to be placed within Group F or to be defined by exhaustive criteria. Group D supplied an alternative route through welfare and medical points. The scheme set out the allocation process and the criteria for its groups, while leaving the precise assessment of points and categorisation to the authority’s judgment. It therefore gave reasonable preference to applicants in medical or welfare need and did not unlawfully fetter discretion.
5. Disposition. Relief was refused on all judicial-review grounds and the section 204 appeal failed. Permission to appeal was refused. Time to seek leave to appeal was extended to 14 days after approval of the transcript. The claimant was ordered to pay the defendant’s costs, subject to detailed assessment and the relevant public-funding provisions.

The judgment itself records no prior appellate decision in this litigation. It concerned a judicial-review claim heard together with a section 204 appeal under the Housing Act 1996.

Permission to appeal was refused. Time to seek leave to appeal was extended to 14 days after approval of the transcript.