St Helens Borough Council v PE & Anor

The inherent jurisdiction over incapable adults is a protective jurisdiction, substantially analogous to wardship. It extends beyond cases involving the doctrine of necessity and may regulate matters conducing to the adult’s welfare and happiness.

The appropriate form of relief depends on the circumstances. Where necessity is engaged, a declaration of lawfulness may be appropriate. Where it is not, the court may make a bare declaration that a course of action is, or is not, in the adult’s best interests. Such relief must address a serious justiciable issue and should not improperly determine public-law questions reserved for judicial review.

The local authority brought proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction concerning the organisation and management of an incapable adult’s extensive care package. The parties agreed a detailed framework for her care, including declarations that particular arrangements were, or were not, in her best interests and an effective delegation to the local authority concerning the care provider.

The court was asked to approve the agreed order and considered whether declarations of best interests were legitimate without accompanying declarations that the arrangements were lawful.

1. Outcome. The agreed order was approved. The court declared that the adult lacked capacity to make decisions about the organisation, management and structure of her care package and that the agreed arrangements were in her best interests.
2. The inherent jurisdiction over incapable adults is a protective jurisdiction, for practical purposes analogous to the parens patriae and wardship jurisdictions. It may regulate a wide range of matters concerning welfare and happiness, including matters where the doctrine of necessity is not engaged. The court may grant whatever declaratory relief is necessary to safeguard and promote the adult’s welfare.
3. The form of relief depends on the context. Where necessity is engaged, the court may declare that an act is lawful despite the absence of valid consent because it is justified by necessity and the adult’s best interests. In other cases, a bare declaration of best interests is legitimate and may be preferable. The court may also declare that a specified person or organisation is, for defined matters, an effective surrogate decision-maker.
4. A bare declaration avoids potentially coercive implications that declaring one course lawful makes all alternatives unlawful. Where private-law welfare issues intersect with public-law questions, a declaration of lawfulness may be inappropriate because public-law issues belong in judicial review proceedings. A bare best-interests declaration may nevertheless be proper.
5. The jurisdiction requires a serious justiciable issue concerning the welfare or happiness of the incapable adult. Its boundaries should develop flexibly, case by case. The court confirmed that this reasoning did not conflict with the separate rule that the inherent jurisdiction cannot determine whether it is in a person’s best interests to marry.