Harlow & Milner Ltd v Teasdale

An adjudicator’s decision is intended to produce a prompt result with which the parties must comply, even though it may later be revised in arbitration. Commencing arbitration does not justify suspending enforcement or postponing execution of the adjudication judgment. The court may abridge the notice period for making an interim charging order final under CPR 73.5, using its case-management powers and the overriding objective, where the delay is limited, service was reasonably prompt, the opposing party identifies no real prejudice, and no substantive opposition is advanced.

The claimant obtained an adjudicator’s award of approximately £90,000 against the defendant. The award was enforced by judgment on 16 January 2006, but the defendant did not pay. The claimant obtained an interim charging order on 20 February 2006. An error in identifying the property delayed service of the corrected order until 27 February, less than 21 days before the final hearing.

The defendant’s solicitors objected both that the notice period required by CPR 73.5 had not been observed and that an ongoing construction arbitration justified postponement. The court considered whether the charging order should be made final and whether time should be abridged.

1. The merits objection failed. An ongoing arbitration did not justify suspending enforcement of the adjudicator’s decision or delaying the charging order. The statutory adjudication scheme was designed to secure prompt compliance. Allowing a party to commence arbitration and thereby postpone payment would undermine that purpose.
2. The notice period could be abridged. Although CPR 73.5 referred to 21 days’ notice, it did not prevent the court from abridging that period under CPR 3.1(2) in appropriate circumstances.
3. The relevant considerations included the overriding objective, the fact that service was only three working days late, service having occurred as soon as reasonably practicable after correction of the order, and the absence of any substantive evidence opposing the application under CPR 73.8(1).
4. The defendant had identified no prejudice caused by the shortened notice. Any adjournment would have caused wasted costs without affecting the result. The time for service was therefore retrospectively abridged.
5. The interim charging order made on 20 February 2006, as amended and returned to the claimant’s solicitors on 23 February, was made final.