Sekfali & Orsv The Department of Public Prosecutions

A person has no general legal duty to assist the police, answer questions or accompany officers when not under arrest. However, a positive act deliberately intended to impede police officers who are lawfully investigating suspected crime may constitute wilful obstruction under section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996. The distinction is between declining to act, where no legal obligation exists, and actively obstructing an officer. The court may infer an intention to go equipped for theft from possession of suitable tools and the surrounding circumstances, particularly where the defendant’s explanation is rejected. The prosecution need not prove every suggested factual inference concerning the use of the tools.

The claimants appealed by way of case stated from convictions at the City of London Magistrates’ Court on 25 May 2005. All three had been convicted of wilfully obstructing police officers in the execution of their duty after running away when officers approached, identified themselves and sought to question them about suspected criminal activity. Ouhab was also convicted of possessing pliers for use in or in connection with theft, contrary to section 25 of the Theft Act.

The central issues were whether officers investigating suspected crime were acting in the execution of their duty despite lacking power to detain the appellants merely for questioning, whether running away could amount to wilful obstruction, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support Ouhab’s conviction for going equipped.

1. Obstruction appeals dismissed. The officers were acting in the execution of their duty when they approached the appellants. Their purpose was to investigate suspected criminal activity by questioning them and comparing them with descriptions obtained from the store. The absence of an arrest meant that the officers were limited in the steps they could take, but it did not prevent them from investigating by asking questions.
2. Section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996 creates an offence of wilfully obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty. A citizen has no legal duty to assist the police. A person may remain silent, refuse to answer questions and decline to accompany officers where there has been no arrest. Those forms of refusal do not, without more, amount to obstruction.
3. The relevant distinction is between refusing to act and doing a positive act. The magistrates were entitled to find that the appellants deliberately ran away in different directions to avoid apprehension and thereby intended to impede the officers. That positive conduct was capable of constituting wilful obstruction, notwithstanding that the appellants were not obliged to remain or answer questions. Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 Q.B. 414 supported that analysis, and the distinction identified in Dibble v Ingleton [1972] 1 Q.B. 480 was applicable.
4. The subsequent arrests and searches did not affect whether obstruction had occurred when the appellants fled. The later events formed a new state of affairs.
5. Ouhab’s appeal against the going-equipped conviction was also dismissed. After rejecting his explanation for possessing the pliers, the magistrates were entitled to infer from the circumstances that he possessed them with the intention of using them in the course of a theft. Any finding about the store’s security-tag system was not essential to that conclusion.
6. The answers to all three questions in the case stated were yes. Costs were ordered against the legally aided appellants on the usual terms.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeals by way of case stated from the City of London Magistrates’ Court were dismissed. The convictions were upheld.