Neale v Director of Public Prosecutions (Rev 1)

Refusing to give a name and address to a police officer is not wilful obstruction unless the person is under a legal obligation to provide the information. There is no general common-law duty to answer police questions, and the right to remain silent is not lost because the officer reasonably suspects criminal offending. A statutory duty to provide personal information cannot be implied merely because it would assist enforcement or the issue of a fixed penalty notice. Where Parliament intends to impose such a duty, it ordinarily does so expressly. Carefully defined police powers should not be expanded by implication, particularly where compelled disclosure engages rights under Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The appellant was convicted at Newport Magistrates’ Court of wilfully obstructing a constable, contrary to section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996. He had refused to give police officers his name and address when they sought to issue a fixed penalty notice under the Health Protection (Coronavirus Restrictions) (Wales) Regulations (SI 2020/353).

The magistrates distinguished Rice v Connolly and held that a duty to provide the information was implicit in the Coronavirus Regulations. The appellant appealed by way of case stated. The central issue was whether his refusal was capable of amounting to wilful obstruction.

1. Appeal allowed. The magistrates erred in distinguishing Rice v Connolly and in convicting the appellant of wilfully obstructing a constable.
2. Section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996 requires proof of obstruction, that the constable was acting in the execution of his duty, and that the obstruction was wilful. Wilfulness requires intentional conduct without lawful excuse. Refusal to provide information is not wilful obstruction where the person has no legal obligation to provide it.
3. There is no general common-law duty to give a name and address to the police. The right to remain silent is not confined to persons who are innocent or beyond suspicion. The fact that the officers suspected that the appellant was contravening the Coronavirus Regulations did not remove that right. The court applied the principle in Rice v Connolly and relied on Sekfali & ors v DPP.
4. The Coronavirus Regulations created no express duty to provide a name and address, and no such duty arose by necessary implication. The enforcement scheme remained workable: an individual could be prosecuted, and section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 permitted arrest where necessary to ascertain identity. The power to issue a fixed penalty notice and the power to remove a person to where they lived did not require an implied duty of compelled disclosure.
5. The court distinguished authorities arising in particular contexts, including Ricketts v Cox, DPP v PJ Carey (Contractors) Limited, Stunt v Bolton and Lunt v DPP. Those cases involved positive obstructive conduct or different statutory contexts, rather than compelled speech.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal by way of case stated from the appellant’s conviction at Newport Magistrates’ Court.